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After seven years of exceptional growth in the 1980s,
the Department of Defense (DOD) budget is confronted with
Congressional budget reduction and deficit control measures.
A revised Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings Act was passed in September
1987 setting annual deficit targets for fiscal years 1988 to
1993. If the legislation is implemented, DOD organizations
face an extended period of financial constraint and
budgetary uncertainty. This thesis examines the flight hour
program of Commander, Patrol Wings Pacific in developing
methods to prepare for an era of budget constraints. The
thesis discusses the Gramm-Rudman Act and general organiza-
tional reaction to fiscal stress. It then analyzes manage-
ment control of nonprofit organizations, productivity
measurement, and alternative accounting and financial
management information systems as means for coping with
budget reduction. Decision-makers" at all levels of the
military must understand these methods in order to manage
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By far the most important reform is the recasting of
budgets and accounts to reveal the costs of meaningful
end-product missions or programs, rather than the costs of
classes of objects. Economic analysis is concerned with
objectives, not objects; it can identify efficient
programs for achieving objectives only if it can relate
costs to such programs. [Hitch and McKean 198 6, p. 23 3]
The importance of understanding the costs of programs
and their priority within an organization is becoming more
critical for all levels of management within the Department
of Defense (DOD) . Political pressure is mounting within
Congress and the Executive branch to balance the budget to
gradually eliminate the nation's deficit. The deficit
peaked in FY86 at $221 billion as the total U.S. government
debt went beyond two trillion dollars. Defense immediately
became a target for cuts in budget authority and appeared
ripe for longer-term reduction of outlays not only because
its budget is so large, but also because it has grown so
rapidly in recent years [Kaufman 1986, p. 33].
A major factor influencing the defense budget is the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 198 5
(revised 1987 by Public Law 100-119) ,' more commonly known as
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act. GRH is a deficit
reduction plan that provides specific goals for eliminating
the deficit by fiscal year 1993. This law could have
disastrous effects on the Department of Defense and its
operating funds, particularly the Operations and
Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) appropriation and the Military
Pay, Navy (MPN) appropriation. The reason these two
appropriations are more at risk than procurement or even
research and development will be explained later in a
discussion of the Gramm-=Rudman Act.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to research the
type of management, accounting, and information systems that
become more valuable in an era of deficit control and budget
reduction. Decision makers in federal government and
particularly in DOD are facing a minimum of five years where
they are confronted with "cutback management." In a book on
financial stress, Levine defines cutback management as
" co. making and implementing hard decisions about. . .which
programs and agencies will be scaled down or terminated and
which clients will be asked to make sacrifices." [Levine
1980, p. 11] In another article on financial crisis, Jones
says that few public managers and analysts have experience
in cutback management and are in need of information on
options for management [Jones 1984, p. 49]. For the first
time in this decade, military leaders and managers will be
in a position where there is no real growth in defense. At
all levels of the government and military, hard decisions
are going to be made on whether to make across-the-board or
vertical cuts in programs.
Hopwood says that a period of constrained resources
places renewed emphasis on costs, financial information and
the calculus of economic decision making [Hopwood (undated)
,
p. 171] . Financial standards, budgets and plans become
more detailed and more subject to change. Accounting
systems are looked to for indications of efficiency and cost
effectiveness. A Government Accounting Office (GAO) report
in December 1987 concerning the Federal Managers Financial
Integrity Act noted that "...there is general recognition
today that most of the government's accounting systems are
generally outmoded, inefficient and ineffective and that
improvements in financial management are urgently needed."
[U.S. General Accounting Office 1987B, p. 34] The report
goes on to say that the federal government has continued to
rely on antiquated accounting systems that were designed in
World War II and, therefore, do not provide the information
required for effective management and decision making.
This thesis centers on one of many military organiza-
tions that could feel the impact of Gramm-Rudman and must
plan for a tighter operational budget over the next five
years. The Flight Hour Program (FHP) for Commander, Patrol
Wings U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPWP) is a part of the Navy's
Operations and Maintenance network and is the focus of this
thesis. The admiral in charge of CPWP has command of 12
operational squadrons flying approximately 110 Lockheed P-3
Orion aircraft whose primary mission is long range
antisubmarine warfare. The squadrons are based at Naval
Air Station, Moffett Field, California and at Naval Air
Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii. Four squadrons are always
deployed to sites throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
An organizational diagram is included in the next chapter.
The financial support for squadron aircraft is divided
into two primary Operational Functional Categories (OFCs) °.
(1) OFC-01 or Flight Operation funds are primarily the fuel
required for flight operations, and (2) OFC-50 or Aviation
Fleet Maintenance (AFM) funds are for aircraft consumables
used in maintaining the aircraft. This thesis is concerned
with Flight Operation funds, a sum which amounted to 45
million dollars in FY87 for the CPWP squadrons [ COMNAVAIRPAC
JUL87, p. 1] . These funds are commonly referred to as the
squadron's OPTAR (operating target).
.OPTAR for squadron programs is received by CPWP in a
quarterly lump sum from the Commander, Naval Air Forces,
U.S. Pacific Fleet (CNAP) . These flight funds are then
allocated by CPWP to each squadron based on a number of
factors that are discussed later. The primary objective is
to achieve the highest degree of operational readiness based
on the funds available.
The Reagan era provided the opportunity for the nation's
defense to increase readiness throughout the fleet and CPWP
was no exception. Mission capability rates increased to the
highest levels ever, reflecting increased funding for spare
parts, avionics improvement programs, and quality training
for both maintenance and aircrew personnel. Mission
capability for all Navy aircraft increased from an average
of 59% in FY80 to 74% in FY86. An aircraft is considered
mission capable if it can perform at least one of its
primary missions. [U.S. Congress 1987B, p. 648]
With budget deficit control now a national priority and
defense a primary target for cutbacks, improvements in
readiness are threatened and managers are faced with
difficult decisions. Decisions are going to be made on
whether to make across-the-board cuts in programs, eliminate
programs, decrease the number of crews per squadron, reduce
support at some deployment sites, or any number of other
options.
This thesis explains why there should be concern with
Gramm-Rudman and then examines a variety of factors that
effect the strategic planning of a military organization.
These factors include aspects such as financial stress,
management control systems, accounting, and organizational
structure. Knowledge gained through research in these areas
should help answer the following research questions:
1. How does a military organization such as CPWP prepare
for an era of Gramm-Rudman budget deficit control?
2. How does the current management control and accounting
system for the P-3 flight hour program compare with an
alternate system based on end-product missions?
3
.
Does the current budget formulation and execution
system for the flying hour program contribute to the
most efficient use of resources?
4. Does an end-product, mission oriented accounting
system provide senior management with the information
needed to make budget decisions that impact readiness?
5. Is there sufficient variance in the fuel usage of
different missions to justify instituting an
accounting system that will establish a standard cost
per hour from which more accurate program cost can be
determined?
6. What characteristics in a military non-profit organi-
zation make the implementation of a management control
system more difficult than a profit oriented company?
B. SCOPE
This thesis uses an operations and maintenance fund, the
flight hour program, to examine what characteristics are
important for an organization that is facing an extended
period of budget constraints. Although applicable to other
operational segments of the military, this research focuses
on the 12 squadrons under the control of CPWP. The proper
level of funding for the flight hour program is a major
factor in achieving readiness standards. Other factors
directly affecting readiness include manning, availability
of spare parts, funding for maintenance consumables, and
proper training of personnel. These and other factors are
important contributors to readiness; however, they are not
part of the scope of this thesis.
There is a much larger flight hour control system at
levels above CPWP, such as CNAP and the Chief of Naval
Operations for Air Warfare (OP-05) . These systems involve a
multitude of different aircraft and are not the subject of
this thesis. The major area examined outside of CPWP is
6
Congressional action on the budget deficit and its impact on
DOD's appropriations.
Beyond examining the current budget formulation and
execution system, this thesis develops an alternative model
for control and accounting that concentrates on end-product
missions. The P-3 has more than 3 types of missions that
are flown each year. This thesis will not determine the
estimated cost of each mission because that is not the
objective of the research. Rather, an accounting system for
collecting the needed cost information is proposed.
Samples of the hourly cost for several different mission
profiles are analyzed to determine whether there is
sufficient variance in cost per hour to warrant establishing
an hourly standard for similar missions vice using the
annual funding rate.
C . METHODOLOGY
This section describes the steps that were taken in
researching the thesis. The concept of using end-product
missions originated from a policy analysis textbook that
proposed using that method for future accounting systems
[Hitch and McKean 1986, p. 233]. This in combination with
material from a management control course [Anthony, Dearden,
and Bedford 1984], a cost accounting course [Horngren and
Foster 1987] and a management policy course [Hosmer 1982]
provided the idea that the current system might be improved.
CPWP flight hour studies and previous theses are used as
a base for analyzing the current system of flight hour
budgeting and management control [Bozin 1981; Burton 1982;
Murray 1986] . A literature search of management control led
to studies of non-profit organizations, organizational
responses to financial stress, accounting systems, and a
current issue, the Gramm-Rudman Act. All of these aspects
are directly applicable to what is going to affect the
financial management horizons of a military organization
over the next five years. An understanding of the
alternatives available is critical for today's leadership
due to the need to maintain productivity with fewer
resources.
D. ORGANIZATION
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I
provides an introduction and general sketch of the issues.
Chapter II describes the CPWP organization and the flow
of funds for the operations and maintenance account. The
chapter discusses the budget formulation and execution
program, the associated financial and management reports,
and the program structure in the CPWP organization. This
sets the framework for how management control and accounting
systems function in* the flight hour program.
Chapter III describes the Gramm-Rudman Act and shows its
relationship to the Department of Defense and its appropria-
tion accounts. An understanding of this legislation is
8
critical for all federal government managers and leaders.
The law is likely to have dramatic effect on DOD's budget
over the next five years. Chapter III also explains why
federal managers should be concerned.
Chapter IV discusses important aspects of financial
stress and cutback management that accompany deficit control
measures like Gramm-Rudman . The characteristics of finan-
cial stress along with a model describing an organization's
reaction to phases of stress are presented. The problem of
facing reduced budgets has been explained as follows
The dilemma in facing cutbacks in the public sector
results in large part from the fact that over the past
thirty years our society and economy have become
accustomed to and dependent upon growth in government.
[Jones 1984, p. 49]
Chapter IV also examines the characteristics of public
and non-profit organizations and takes a look at management
control systems for government. Military organizations do
not have traditional measures of performance such as profit.
This creates - difficulties in measuring performance and
determining whether resources were used efficiently. In
addition, this chapter relates various aspects of management
to the system used by CPWP.
Chapter V provides a discussion of accounting and
management information systems. A program structure is
proposed and compared against the current system at CPWP.
The pros and cons of using a management information system
to collect the necessary accounting data are discussed. The
cost per hour for several different mission profiles are
examined from a statistical viewpoint to determine if the
accumulation of variances from an overall cost per hour is
necessary or useful.
Chapter VI presents conclusions and makes recommenda-
tions on how an organization such as CPWP can prepare for an
era of budget constraints and control. Knowledge of
alternatives is important when difficult financial choices
have to be made; this thesis discusses a number of the
factors which have an impact on such choices.
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II. CPWP
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the CPWP
organization, its budget formulation and execution system,
the financial reports used in executing the budget, and the
programs in the flight hour program. An understanding of
the organization and its flow of funding is necessary since
particular aspects of this system are addressed throughout
the remainder of the thesis.
A. ORGANIZATION
This section describes an organizational structure for
CPWP and the flow of funds through associated commands. This
facilitates the later discussions of budgets and control
systems. Like all other appropriations, the Operations and
Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) account goes through a complicated
Congressional negotiation process prior to its approval in
an Appropriations Act. The following paragraphs provide a
brief description of what happens to funds after Congres-
sional approval and how they get to the end user.
Once passed as a law by Congress, the Treasury
department issues Appropriation Warrants to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) for countersignature to ensure
agreement between the executive and legislative branches
prior to execution. Each warrant identifies the amount for
a particular appropriation and any restrictions placed on
11
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the account by Congress. These warrants make the
appropriated funds available for apportionment by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) . The apportionment process
determines the maximum amount of money that can be obligated
during a specific time frame, i.e., some funds must spend
all of the money during a particular fiscal year while
others, such as procurement, are spread over several years
with spending caps for each year. The apportionment process
provides 0&M,N funds on a quarterly basis. These sums are
typically different for each quarter to provide control over
spend-out rates for the various appropriations. An
allocation process dominates the remaining distribution of
funds commencing with the Department of Defense as shown in
Figure 1 on the next page. [Practical Comptrollership Manual
1988, p. A-27]
The allocation of resources for commands above CPWP is
more difficult from the standpoint that funds must be
divided between a large assortment of aircraft and ships.
The budget formulation process provides a starting point for
the allocations of 0&M,N funds. The method for determining
the financial needs of patrol squadrons is discussed below.
B. BUDGET FORMULATION
The flight hour and budget requirements for aviation
squadrons revolve around a concept called Primary Mission
Readiness (PMR) : the average number of flight hours required
per crew per month for a complete 18 month training and
12
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deployment cycle. Derivation of PMR is not addressed to
keep the thesis unclassified. For the purpose of this
thesis this information is unnecessary. The annual
requirements for the CPWP OPTAR can be determined in the
following manner:
Annual Flight Hours = PMR * (12 crews/sqd.) * (12 squadrons)
* (12 months/year)
Annual Funding = Annual Flight Hours * Cost per flight hour
The cost per flight hour is determined by the DOD
contracted fuel price for the year multiplied by the
historical average of gallons per flight hour used by each
model of the P-3 aircraft.
PMR is the "average" monthly flight hour requirement
over a complete 18 month training and deployment cycle. The
12 patrol squadrons are in one of three phases at any given
time. A squadron is either deployed, in a ready/alert
status, or in training. Flight hours for each of these
phases are divided into operational and training
requirements. The estimated operational requirements for
each phase are determined by historical data. The training
hours are supported by an extremely detailed breakdown of
squadron training needs. One way to understand the cycle
requirements and how they relate to training and operations
hours is to use the matrix shown in Table 1.
The required flight hours per crew per month for each
phase of employment is different and varies from the 18
14
TABLE 1
FLIGHT HOUR MODEL FOR VP SQUADRON
Squadron Phases for 18 Month Cycle
Deployed Ready Alert Training
Training Hrs. A B C
Ops Hrs. D E None
Total Monthly Hrs A + D B + E C
Hrs/Crew/Month (A+D)/12 (B+E)/12 C /12
month cycle average—PMR. Funding levels for each of the
employment phases are commonly expressed as a percentage of
PMRc If budgeted at the readiness and operational levels
required in the PMR studies, the following amount of flight
hours per crew per month would be funded:
Deployed = PMR * 13 6%
Ready Alert = PMR * 107%
Training = PMR * 67%
Now that some of the basic elements of the budget formu-
lation process have been presented, a discussion of budget
execution is in order.
C. ,; BUDGET EXECUTION
Budget execution for CPWP and its 12 squadrons is like
that employed by many government agencies. A lump sum is
15
allocated to support an organization whose services are
unique and output is heterogeneous, hard-to-def ine and very
difficult to measure [Jones and Thompson 1986, p. 39].
The allocation of flight resources from Commander, Naval
Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CNAP) to CPWP is based on
three factors: a percentage of PMR, the historical gallons
per hour used for each type aircraft, and the contracted DOD
cost of fuel. The key variable in this computation is the
percentage of PMR to be funded. Under normal circumstances,
and particularly during a period of financial constraints,
this percentage will be less than the desired 100%. The
reason the cost of fuel is not considered as much of a key
variable is that Public Law 100-180 which controls the DOD
appropriation says under the O&M section that additional
sums are authorized for: (1) unbudgeted increases in fuel
cost and (2) unbudgeted increases as a result of inflation
in the cost of activities [Congress 1987B] . Without such a
provision in the appropriation act, fluctuations in oil
prices would be a volatile factor in determining the flight
hours available to meet mission needs.
In effect, CPWP competes for funding along with the
other large aviation commands under CNAP. According to
Jones and Thompson, such competition, "...is viewed as
competition for the market vice competition in the market."
[Jones and Thompson 198 6, p. 37] Anthony and Young
reinforce this idea by saying that in the absence of a
16
market mechanism for allocating resources, the manager's
objective in a public supported non-profit organization is,
"...to get as large a slice as possible of the... pie."
[Anthony and Young 1984, p. 46] Senior management, such as
CNAP, must judge what services are in the best interest of
the public, rather than responding to specific market demand
signals.
The allocation of 0&M,N funds by operational commanders
is a continuous process because of the practice of quarterly
apportionment by OMB and also due to the uncertain outcomes
of the budgetary process. This lack of long-term funding
precludes meaningful long-range planning. Planners are
forced into a continuous "what if" scenario developing
numerous budgeting contingencies.
CPWP receives an annual planning figure (APF) from CNAP
at the beginning of each fiscal year which is then modified
once the appropriation bills are passed by Congress. The
accuracy of this figure depends on a multitude of factors
including budget stability, Gramm-Rudman initiatives, and
fluctuating demands on military resources as created by the
Persian Gulf or Central America. A paragraph from a CNAP
November 1987 message to CPWP best describes the budgetary
uncertainty involved:
There are still significant uncertainties and pressures on
the Flying Hour Program. The 70K hour APF may be
unsupportable within the FHP resources provided to CNAP.
Request continued efforts to ensure VP aircrews receive
necessary and appropriate levels of training to
17
successfully carry out assigned missions. [ COMNAVAIRPAC
NOV87, p. 1]
CNAP's quarterly OPTAR allocation authorizes CPWP to
distribute financial resources to squadrons. On a smaller
scale, CPWP is faced with many of the same allocation
decisions as CNAP. CPWP must decide which allocation method
optimizes force readiness. In a time of financial
constraints, this requires decisions on whether to terminate
programs, make across-the-board cuts, reduce deployment
commitments, or use some combination of these initiatives.
A discussion of cutback alternatives is included in Chapter
IV on financial stress.
The position of Commander, Patrol Wing Ten (CPW-10) and
Commander, Patrol Wing Two (CPW-2) are in the organizational
diagram at the beginning of this chapter. They are an
extremely important intermediary between CPWP and the
squadrons. Although not formally involved in budget
allocation and execution, they provide major inputs to the
decision making process concerning all aspects of the flight
hour program. The commander of each wing is the primary
evaluator of squadron performance and signs the fitness
reports for the squadron commanding officers. The squadron
commandinq officer does not formally report to the winq
commander for budqet execution. Therefore, financial
management is not normally one of the factors upon which a
commandinq officer is judqed. That this appears to be a
flaw in the management control system was a major point in
18
previous theses on the flight hour program [Bozin 1981,
Burton 1982, Murray 1986].
The end user of flight hour funds is the squadron which
must utilize the financial resources provided by CPWP to
maintain the highest possible readiness. Readiness is
designed to measure how effectively and efficiently the
squadron utilizes its assets and financial resources. As
mentioned previously, readiness is a measure of a number of
factors including utilization of the flying hours, training,
manning, material condition of capital assets, and
availability of spare parts. Because there are so many
inputs and only one measure of output, it is difficult to
measure how efficiently resources of individual inputs are
used.
The flying hour program is one of the inputs that has no
singular measure of performance. There is no good measure
of how efficiently the squadron's OPTAR funds are spent. It
is difficult to tell how much readiness is achieved per
flight hour and what types of flights contribute the most to
overall readiness. The flight hours used are not compared
to PMR, the budget formulation model for flight hours.
The quarterly allocation provides both an authorization
for hours and money. This is meant to cause the squadrons
to fly efficiently. The dollar figure is based on a
calculation involving historical fuel usage, the hours
granted, and the cost per gallon of gas. A derived cost per
19
hour figure results from the statistical analysis of
historical fuel usage combined with the current cost per
gallon. Although this figure is used in sguadrons as a
management tool for controlling the overall flight hour
program, it is meaningless as a measure of efficiency for
individual flights. Sguadrons fly more than 3 different
missions which means numerous flight profiles and varying
levels of fuel usage. If a squadron is flying more
"efficiently" than the historical trend, more hours can be
granted to ensure all the funds are spent. However, the
opposite is not true. A squadron flying above the
historical cost per hour will generally not be given the
additional funds required to fly the remaining hours. The
objective is to have zero funds and zero hours left at the
end of the quarter without any over-obligation. As Anthony
and Young state, "...the ideal financial performance in a
non-profit organization is a break-even one." [Anthony and
Young 1984, p. 41]
Budgets with a spending limit, the goal of a zero
balance, and no standards for efficiency are generally the
result of a fiduciary type accounting system. Anthony and
Young describe fiduciary accounting as a system that "keeps
track of the funds entrusted to an organization to ensure
that they were spent honestly." [Anthony and Young 1984, p.
55] This type of accounting still exists in some government
organizations and is associated with outdated accounting and
20
budgeting systems. As pointed out in a December 1987 GAO
report, the government's accounting and budgeting systems
"...are generally outmoded, ineffective, and inefficient."
[U.S. General Accounting Office 1987B, p. 34] Generally,
the principles that distinguish modern systems from the
fiduciary type accounting are the accrual concept, cost
accounting, standard costing, variance analysis, budgeting
and responsibility accounting [Anthony and Young 1984, p.
55] c Some of these items are discussed later in Chapter V
on accounting and information systems.
D. BUDGET REPORTS
The reporting network for the flight hour program
involves informal ten day reports that remain in the
squadron, a monthly Budget OPTAR Report (BOR) for CNAP and
the Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Center, Pacific
(FAADCPAC) , and a mission summary sheet that goes to CPWP.
The ten day report is generated on the 10th, 2 0th, and
last day of each month for the Commanding Officer since he
is held accountable for the proper expenditure of funds.
The report summarizes the flight hours and cost per hour for
the last ten days, the month to date, quarter to date, and
fiscal year to date. This report is the Commanding
Officer's management tool for monitoring the flight hour
program.
The monthly BOR is the only flight hour funding report
that leaves the squadron. Although the report goes to
21
FAADCPAC, the comptroller at CNAP is the funding manager
most interested in its content and accuracy. This is
because CNAP is the responsibility center for the 0&M,N
account and, therefore, legally accountable for budget
execution of the Flight Hour Program [Practical
Comptrollership Manual 1988, p. A-29] . An important
standard for budget control, subsection 1517 of 31 USCA
"...prohibits any officer or employee from making or
authorizing an obligation in excess of the amount available
in an appropriation...." [Practical Comptrollership Manual
1988, p. A-4] Under-obligation is not as severe a problem
since a small carryover is allowed for the first three
quarters of the fiscal year. Repeated under-obligation is
generally viewed as poor management that may result in a
cutback in funds due to lack of need. The reporting of
budget execution by squadrons skips two levels in the chain
of command to expedite the accumulation of financial
information. In fact, the BOR is due no later than the 2nd
day of the month following the month being reported.
The mission summary report sent to CPWP delineates the
type of missions and the total hours flown in each category.
This information is summarized into five general mission
categories and forwarded to CNAP: (1) training, (2)
exercise, (3) operational, (4) service, and (5) contingency.
CNAP in turn summarizes the same data for all types of
aircraft under its control and forwards the information to
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the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-51C) [ COMNAVAIRPAC APR87,
p. 1].
E. PROGRAM STRUCTURE
The members of the naval aviation community continually
examine the trends in modern warfare and evaluate methods
for coping with an ever-changing environment. Alternatives
are proposed to deal with uncertainties and future threats.
Current assets and financial trends are examined to
determine what strategy should be adopted to solve a
particular problem. The question frequently arises as to
whether to modify a current weapons platform or seek funds
for the development of a new system.
The P-3 aircraft has existed for approximately 3 years
and is still in production [U.S. General Accounting Office
1987D, p. 3]. Because of its long range, endurance, speed
and size, the P-3's role has expanded considerably in
response to a changing environment. The primary missions
remain long-range antisubmarine warfare and ocean
surveillance; however, numerous other missions now consume
scarce resources. A P-3 crew could be preparing for any of
over 3 different type flights. Missions and programs are
added, but few are ever eliminated. "Programs tend to go on
forever unless they are subject to periodic, hard headed
reexamination." [Anthony and Young 1984, p. 561] Nonprofit
organizations have an inclination to progressively expand
their responsibilities, eventually losing some effectiveness
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in the primary missions [Hosmer 1982, p. 426]. Hosmer
contends that managers do not think in terms of a focus for
that organization; instead, the tendency is to offer
multiple combinations of services, recipients and processes,
which results in the familiar problem of "...being all
things to all people." [Hosmer 1982, p. 426] He goes on to
say that "...to create a centralized focus in activities and
a potential savings in cost is certainly useful at nonprofit
organizations...." [Hosmer 1982, p. 427]
With a diverse number of programs involved, it is
important that the leaders and managers in the P3 community
know the annual cost of each program. In a time of deficit
control, the probability for cutbacks is high and the best
alternative, may be to cut the programs on the fringe of the
P-3 B s responsibility or those with the least benefit for the
cost involved. Another alternative may be to charge
agencies for flying missions that are not designated as
primary or secondary. This is not an uncommon practice and
generally determines whether the program is truly needed.
Many of the Navy's test and evaluation squadrons receive the
majority of their flight hour funding via this method.
[Byrne 1987] . As before, this alternative also requires
accuracy in the costing of programs.
CPWP collects monthly information on the number of hours
flown in each mission. Chapter V of this thesis examines
different missions to determine whether there is significant
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enough variation in cost per hour to warrant collecting cost
per hour for each program. The program breakdown required
by CPWP is detailed and contained in Appendix B.
Information from this report is summarized into the five
general categories mentioned previously and forwarded to
CNAP.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter provided an understanding of the CPWP
organization and how 0&M,N funds are budgeted and reported.
The accounting system in many government organizations is
outdated and does not encourage the most efficient use of
public resources. This trait is more characteristic of the
formal flight hour accounting system where an object class
is the focus instead of programs. The importance of a
financial management information system based on programs
instead of object classes will be demonstrated in Chapter V.
Additionally, Chapter IV on financial stress, explains why
there is an increasing expectation for efficiency, cost
effectiveness, and accounting systems when funding is
constrained.
The section on program structure and the expansion of
mission requirements in P-3 squadrons explained the need for
a focus of responsibilities and a review of missions. Based
upon this, the question may be posed as whether it is not
better to be superb at a few well-defined missions rather
than average over a large number? To prevent the expansion
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of tasks outside of primary missions, perhaps users of the
information should be required to provide funding to support
the additional flight operations requested. Pricing of
programs may be the only way to control the demands placed
on the P-3 aircraft . For example, P-3 squadrons are
reimbursed for supporting the Drug Enforcement Agency for
all designated drug surveillance flights. There may be
other missions where the same approach is applicable.
Operating funds for CPWP and many other military and
government agencies could be seriously affected by deficit
control measures over the next decade. The usefulness of
accounting systems for cost control is likely to become




The same factors that led Congress to reduce the
defense budget for fiscal years 198 6 and 1987 are present
again this year: intense pressure to lower the federal
deficit, congressional unwillingness to cut spending on
domestic social programs, and the president's refusal to
raise taxes. As a result, there is general agreement that
the Reagan administration's defense goals will not be
achieved. No consensus exists, however, on which of the
competing programs deserve priority. [U.S. Congress
1987C, p. 66]
A revised Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings Act (G-R-H) , formally
called the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
of 1987, became Public Law 100-119 on 29 September 1987.
Along with the important purpose of increasing the ceiling
on the national debt to $2.8 trillion, the bill reestab-
lished G-R-H initiatives such as annual deficit ceilings and
sequestration procedures for the federal budget through
FY93.
In a RAND corporation paper on G-R-H, it is noted that
"Although the broad outlines of G-R-H are widely known, the
details are not well understood." [Gotz 1986, p. 1] This
chapter examines the various aspects of G-R-H that are
considered important for military leaders to understand.
Like most other laws, its implementation is rather
complicated, but it does provide a cap on the size of the
federal government's annual deficit—outlays minus revenues
equals deficit. The definition of these terms and others
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involved in the federal budget process are discussed
subsequently because they are critical to the understanding
of G-R-H.
Deficit control measures are not new to the federal
government. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, Public Law 99-177, December 12, 1985,
was the first attempt to implement deficit control measures.
This law took affect with the FY8 6 budget and required a
balanced budget by FY92. In Senate Budget Committee
hearings on 14 July 1987 entitled "New Deficit Estimates and
Revising the Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings Targets," the chairman of
the committee, Senator Chiles, discussed the first years of
G-R-H.
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings has been applied to two fiscal
years so far. The total deficit reduction has been
roughly half the intended annual target of $36 billion.
So we have found a number of problems in these first years
under the deficit reduction plan*
First, the original baseline deficit from which all of
the reductions were to flow has been inaccurate. The
deficit was some $50 billion higher than the law assumed.
That helped make each of the annual deficit targets
unrealistic and unreachable. So in effect, the flag was
raised higher than we could climb the pole.
Secondly, when the Supreme Court struck down the
automatic sequester provision, it took the guard out of
the watchtowers, and where automatic sequester had made
escape impossible, its removal changed the whole mood in
Washington. We suddenly had a sense that there was a way
out. Now there is an even more compelling reason for
putting the force back in the law. [U.S. Congress 1987C,
p. 1]
The revised Gramm-Rudman deficit control law enacted in
September 1987 corrected both of the problems discussed by
Senator Chiles. The budget deficit targets were revised to
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reflect more realistic targets with a goal of zero deficit
by FY93 and the automatic sequester was revised to meet
legal requirements. The law now had teeth and could
dramatically affect the Department of Defense which is
required to absorb 50% of any required outlay reductions.
Before explaining about G-R-H, a discussion of budget
terminology is needed.
Be BUDGET TERMINOLOGY
Understanding budget terminology is crucial to knowing
the implications of G-R-H. Knowledge of the following terms
will provide a good basis for comprehending pertinent
aspects of the budget process and G-R-H:
Budget Authority—-Authority provided by law that
permits government agencies to incur obligations,
requiring either immediate or future payment of money.
The amount authorized by the Congress to become available
for obligation in a given fiscal year is called budget
authority for that year. [Wildavsky 1984, p. 283]
Outlays—The actual amount of dollars spent for a
particular activity. The total results from both new
budget authority provided this year and unexpended
balances of budget authority provided in previous years.
It is the level of outlays compared to the level of
revenues that determines whether the budget is in surplus
or deficit. Figure 2 helps explain the relationship
between outlays and budget authority. [Wildavsky 1984, p.
289]
Authorization—-Basic substantive legislation enacted
by the Congress that sets up a federal program or agency
either indefinitely or for a specified period of time.
Such legislation is a prerequisite for the subsequent
enactment of budget authority and may set limits on the
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'•Outlays from previous budget authority for DOD repre-
sents almost 40% of current year outlays vice the 24% seen
in this diagram for the federal government.
Source: [Dept. of the Navy 1987, Fig. 1]
Figure 2. Federal Government Budget Relation of
Budget Authority to Outlays—FY87
(billions of dollars)
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Appropriation—An act of Congress that allows federal
agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of
the Treasury for specified purposes. This is the most
common form of budget authority . [Wildavsky 1984, p. 281]
Entitlement Program—Legislation that requires the
payment of specified benefits to all eligible persons who
seek them. Generally, these programs are permanently
authorized and are not subject to annual appropriations.
Examples are Social Security, Medicare, and Veterans'
pensions. These programs and gualif ications for
entitlement can only be changed by a separate authorizing
bill. [Congressional Quarterly 1988B, p. 336]
Mandatory spending—Outlays for entitlement programs.
[Congressional Quarterly 1988B, p. 336]
Discretionary spending—Funds appropriated by Congress
each year. [Congressional Quarterly 1988B, p. 336]
Revenues—Sources of money for the federal government.
This includes taxes, user fees, and sales of federal
assets. Sale of assets does not count as an increase in
revenue for G-R-H, therefore, is not considered a deficit
reducing measure. [Congressional Quarterly 1988B, p. 336]
Debt—The cumulative total of the government's annual
deficit. Interest on the debt is now the third largest
expense in the federal budget totalling $151.8 billion in
1988. The national debt has nearly tripled since FY80
growing from $914.3 billion to a projected $2,825 trillion
in FY89. [Rapp 1988 no. 8, p. 327]
Sequestration—Automatic triggering of procedures to
cancel budget authority if the "projected deficit" exceeds
the G-R-H target required by law. A $10 billion buffer
above the targets provides a cushion before 0MB implements
automatic and across the board percentage spending cuts.
[Congressional Quarterly 1988B, p. 336]
Continuing resolution—-Legislation enacted by the
Congress to provide budget authority for specific ongoing
activities in cases where the regular fiscal year
appropriation for such activities has not been enacted by
the beginning of the fiscal year. The continuing
resolution usually specifies a maximum rate at which the
agency may incur obligations, based on the rate of the
prior year, the President's budget request, or an
appropriation bill passes by either or both Houses of
Congress. [Wildavsky 1984, p. 284]
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National defense (50) account & Defense (51) account—
There is frequent confusion between these two accounts.
Congress deals only with the (50) account in their annual
resolutions. This account includes the traditional
military defense account (51) plus defense functions that
are carried out in other federal agencies, such as atomic
energy, civil defense, stockpiling of strategic materials,
and the selective service system. These functions
comprise about $8 billion of the National Defense budget*
The Defense account (51) is what is traditionally defined
as defense—operation & maintenance, procurement, military
personnel, research & development, military construction
and several small miscellaneous categories. The National
Defense (50) account will exceed the Defense (51) account
by approximately $8 billion. [Kaufman 1986, p. 6]
C. G-R-H AND THE BUDGET PROCESS
Whether Congress will adhere to the rules imposed by the
recent G-R-H legislation is debatable; however, they have
certainly laid the groundwork for steps toward deficit
reduction. Since raising taxes is an unpopular political
initiative, efforts to reduce the deficit have centered on
control and reduction of outlays via budget authority. As
previously mentioned, G-R-H requires the Department of
Defense to assume responsibility for 50% of the outlay
reductions required if the projected deficit exceeds the G-
R-H target by more than $10 billion for FY88-FY92. There is
no buffer for FY93; therefore, legislation requires a
balanced budget in that year.
The deficit targets set by the G-R-H are shown in Table
2. These amounts do not include the buffer of $10 billion.
There also is a clause in the law that limits the amount of
outlay reductions (sequestration) required to $23 billion in












deficit. This ostensibly avoids the problem Senator Chiles
discussed earlier-—having impossible targets because of a
gross miscalculation in projecting the deficit. This
measure gives a goal for FY88 and FY89 even if deficit
projections are high relative to GRH targets.
Congressional compliance with the rules of the budget
process has generally been regarded as poor throughout the
1980s. Congress has ignored budget deadlines, let the
authorization and appropriation process get out of balance,
and resorted to continuing resolutions to keep the
government funded. This lack of organization in budgeting
has resulted in hastily approved appropriations several
months into the new fiscal year, programs authorized but not
funded, programs with approved appropriations but never
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authorized, and a budget with a large deficit. Secretary
Robert Conn, Undersecretary of the Navy for Finance and
Comptroller, has expressed strong feelings that the lack of
focus and agreement within Congress is due to the change in
the source of funding for elections from the party to the
individual. This has caused an increase in pork barrel
politics and diminishing focus on national priorities [Conn
1988]
.
Public pressure for responsible fiscal management in
Congress created a demand for G-R-H. This legislation had
teeth in the form of sequestration which would pressure both
Congress and the President to take immediate action. "The
automatic sequester provision is the nuclear deterrent in
the budget process." [U.S. Congress 1987C, p. 3]
Since the revised G-R-H was enacted 29 September 1987
and the first year of deficit targets was FY88, Congress was
immediately confronted with major budget decisions.
Congress needed to pass a reconciliation bill that met G-R-H
targets by 20 October 1987 1 or sequestration of $23 billion
would be ordered to become effective 2 November. Congress
failed to meet the 2 October deadline, which triggered
automatic sequestration procedures. Congress now had one
month to propose an alternative deficit reduction plan or
0MB would institute across-the-board spending cuts in
-'•These were special dates established for the first
year of G-R-H implementation.
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eligible programs. The inability of Congress to meet self-
imposed deadlines, and the threat of sequestration may have
contributed to the readjustment of financial markets and
international stock exchanges in October 1987 [Rapp 1988 no.
13, p. 767].
It may be argued that sequestration is not the most
prudent alternative for financial management of federal
funds, but it is an effective tool for prodding Congress to
take action on an important problem—the deficit. In
November 1987, the President and Congress took the necessary
action to void the sequestration order for $23 billion.
However, it is important to understand the extent of the
consequences had sequestration occurred.
Because of numerous exempted programs, one-third of the
federal budget would have to absorb the full $2 3 billion
cut. As mentioned previously, DOD would have been
responsible for 50% or in this case, $11.5 billion of the
reductions in outlays. President Reagan exempted military
personnel appropriations from sequestration, thereby forcing
other defense accounts to absorb increased reductions.
Since Congress had not approved a budget, the baseline for
computing reductions would have been based on the budget
submitted by the President to Congress. To yield $11.5
billion in outlay reductions, a higher amount would have to
have been deducted from budget authority. For the DOD O&M
account , the plan called for a $11.0 billion budget
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authority reduction to reach $8 billion of DOD's $11.5
billion reduction in outlays [Congressional Quarterly 1987F,
p. 2433]. The mathematics supporting this phenomenon are
explained later in this chapter.
House Budget Chairman William H. Gray III stated that,
"It was important to send a message to the American people
—
and to the marketplace—that Congress, or at least the
House, was going to act differently on the budget this
year." [Rapp 1988 no. 13, p. 767] On 14 November 1987,
leaders of Congress and the administration reached a
"Summit" agreement concerning the budgets for FY88 and FY89.
This legislation, formally called the Leadership Amendment
to S. 1920, The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987
became Public Law 100-203 on 22 December 1987. The summit
agreement achieved the goals necessary to forestall G-R-H
sequestration that had been ordered by detailing a deficit
reduction plan of $25.6 billion for FY88 and $42 billion for
FY89 [U.S. Congress 1987E, p. 2]. Table 3 shows the
spending caps for National Defense in FY88 and FY89 that
were agreed upon as part of the summit deficit reduction
plan.
The Summit called for a decrease in defense outlays of
$5 billion for FY88, which required a budget authority
cutback of $13 billion. O&M lost 6.6% from its previously
requested level of increase in that reduction [Towell 1988
no. 2, p. 55]. To meet the FY89 ceiling, Secretary of
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TABLE 3
NATIONAL DEFENSE (050) CEILINGS—FY88 & FY89
(billions of dollars)
FY88 FY89
Budget Authority 292.0 299.5
Outlays 285.4 294.0
Source: [U.S. Congress 1987E: Errata]
Defense Carlucci ordered planners to reduce $3 3 billion in
budget authority from Secretary Weinberger's previously
submitted budget to meet an outlay reduction of $8.2 billion
agreed to in the Summit.
The Summit agreement provided boundaries to a rather
volatile budget situation. Having spending caps established
for major appropriations through FY89 enabled longer-term
planning and also provided a framework within which to make
decisions.
Theoretically, all budget resolutions, authorizations
and appropriations should be passed by Congress prior to
0MB' s forecast of the deficit each August.
Under Gramm-Rudman , as revised in 1987, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) , determines whether the
estimated budget deficit will meet a target set in the law
and, if not, what percentage spending cuts (sequester)
will be needed. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
plays an advisory role.
If cuts are needed in fiscal 1989, they will be
imposed in a preliminary order Aug. 25, 1988 and become
permanent October 15, if no alternative is enacted by that
time.
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The Gramm-Rudman target for fiscal 1989 is $136
billion with a $10 billion margin of error. As a result
automatic spending cuts will be triggered if the OMB
deficit exceeds $146 billion. For fiscal 1989, the law
also provides that such cuts will not exceed $36 billion.
[Congressional Quarterly 1988B, p. 336]
Both OMB and CBO publish economic forecasts. Because of
the difficulty in estimating the nominal Gross National
Product (GNP) and numerous other factors, the amount of
revenues to be received in future fiscal years is frequently
a point of disagreement between Congress and the President.
This fact, in combination with different interest rate
expectations, has often caused wide variation in the 1980s
between the forecast of OMB and CBO. Since Gramm-Rudman
sequestrations are based on forecasted economic conditions
by OMB and CBO, a political scenario develops as to which
prediction Congress chooses to use.
».eif Congress were to use its own projections prepared by
the CBO, it would have to cut much more deeply into
spending, raise more taxes, or both, to meet the target—
a
political near-impossibility in this election year.
[Cranford 1988 no. 8, p. 337]
Table 4 on the next page shows the difference in FY87 to
FY89 projections for OMB and the CBO.
The difference between revenue and outlay predictions is
because of different assumptions made by OMB and CBO in
economic forecasting. Small percentage differences amount
to billions of dollars. Economic growth is a factor in
determining revenues from taxes and interest rate determines
outlays required to borrow money. The following comparison
explains the prediction differences in Table 4:
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TABLE 4
DEFICIT PROJECTIONS FOR OMB AND CBO
(billions of dollars)
FY87 1 FY88 FY89
Administration Estimate
(OMB)
Outlays • $1,004.6 $1,056.4 $1,107.3
Revenues 854.1 908.9 964.7
Deficit -150.4 -147.5 -142.7
G-R-H Target N/A -144.0 -13 6.0
Difference2 - (3.5) (6.7)
Congressional Budget Office
Estimate (CBO)
Outlays $1,004.6 $1,054.6 $1,129.0
Revenues 854.1 897.3 953.0
Deficit -150.4 -157.3 -176. 3
G-R-H Target N/A -144.0 -136.0
Difference - (13.3) (30.0)
1Actual figures used therefore both OMB and CBO agree.
2 Does not reflect buffer of $10 billion. Same for the
CBO differences.
3Revised on 5 March 1988 to -$165 billion.
Source: Cranford 1988 no. 8, p. 337]
The Council of Economic Advisors forecast for 1988 is
for modest inflation-adjusted economic growth (2.4 percent
fourth quarter to fourth quarter) , inflation about at last
year's [1987] level, lower unemployment than last year and
interest rates marginally below those of last year. For
1989, the Council projects stronger growth (3.5 percent)
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and continued declines in unemployment, inflation and
interest rates. [Council of Economic Advisors represent
the predictions of the President and OMB]
CBO disagrees, forecasting growth of 1.8 percent in
1988 and 2.6 percent in 1989, similar inflation rates,
unemployment unchanged from 1987 and higher interest
rates. [Cranford 1988 no. 8, p. 338]
The forecasting of a deficit will play a major role in
the implementation of G-R-H and sequestration. The acting
director of the CBO, Mr. James Blum, objected to the opinion
that using OMB forecasts would help Congress in their battle
with deficit control in 1988 (FY89) . He said that, "Sooner
or later reality would catch up and that would make the
fiscal 1990 budget targets that much harder to reach."
[Cranford 1988 no. 8, p. 338] "On the average since 1980,
congressional budgets have underestimated the deficit by
more than $42 billion a year." [Cranford 1988 no. 8, p.
337] This comment causes observers to wonder whether G-R-H
is merely an exercise in budgetary symbolism.
D. MONEY MANAGEMENT UNDER G-R-H
As mentioned previously, reducing outlays or the money
actually going out of the Treasury is the goal of the G-R-H
legislation. Controlling outlays and deciding where to make
cuts is a tremendously difficult task for some of the
following reasons: (1) the annual spend-out rates for the
various appropriations are different and are not certain
[U.S. Congress 1987D, p. 77]; (2) many programs are exempted
from sequestration or budget reductions, particularly
entitlement and pension programs [Gotz 1986, p. 1] ; (3)
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stretch-outs of procurement programs are discouraged because
the unit cost will normally increase, which dilutes the
financial advantage of buying economic quantities [U.S.
Congress 1987A, p. 33]; (4) the Department of Defense is
restricted to a total of $1.5 billion that it can transfer
between appropriations which establishes boundaries for
DOD's outlay rate [Congressional Quarterly 1988E, p. 727];
(5) 2 outlays resulting from a previous year's budget
authority are untouchable because of cancellation fees and
legal penalties [U.S. Congress 1987D, p. 78]; and (6) the
cost of some programs must be absorbed by current
appropriations rather than augmented by Congressional
funding, such as Persian Gulf operations and a portion of
annual pay raises [Congressional Quarterly 1988C, p. 769].
An understanding of these aspects and how they interact with
G-R-H is important.
Annual spend-out rates for DOD appropriation accounts
vary considerably and are frequently grouped as "slow money"
or "fast money." Spend-out rate refers to the percentage of
budget authority available that is spent in a particular
fiscal year. Table 5 on the next page shows the spend-out
rates for DOD's appropriation accounts.
An important point to remember is that cash outlays are
the focal point for G-R-H deficit reduction targets while




DEFENSE OUTLAY RATES, FISCAL YEAR 1988
(percent of first-year budget authority spent)1
Year/Percentages
Appropriation title 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
"Slow-money" investment accts.
Procurement 15 30 27 14 6 1
Research & Development 50 38 8 1
Military Construction 12 39 23 13 6 4
Aggregate for investment





Aggregate for Expense accts. 83 13 2
^Percentages rounded to nearest whole number.
Source; [U.S. Congress 1987D, p. 77]
budget authority is the vehicle for controlling outlays.
Making the conversion from budget authority to outlays
creates some serious management problems. The spend-out
rate must be 100% to save $1 in outlays for every $1 cut in
budget authority. With an aggregate spend-out rate of 2 6%
for the slow money, there must be $3.85 ($1/0.26) aggregate





such as military personnel that have a spend-out rate of 94%
require a budget authority cut of $1.06 to save $1 in
outlays.
As was shown in Figure 2, the outlays for the current
year are an accumulation of the outlays resulting from new
budget authority plus outlays from budget authority granted
in previous years. For DOD, the authority from prior year
budgets represents approximately 4 percent of the outlays
for the year. As mentioned previously, these outlays have
generally been considered untouchable because of
cancellation fees and legal penalties [U.S. Congress 1987D,
p. 78]. Joshua Epstein, a research associate for the
Brookings Institute comments on this as follows:
Beyond this uncontrollable 4 percent of each year's
outlays another 3 percent or so is needed simply to pay,
house, and administer the defense establishment. Thus if
large deficit reductions--that is, cuts in actual
spending—are to be made in the current year, and the
major capital projects, such as new strategic and naval
programs, are protected from reductions; readiness—
which has grown with the budget as a whole—is bound to
suffer badly. [U.S. Congress 1987D, p. 78]
Readiness and people programs appear to be in a
precarious position if significant and short-notice
reductions are required in DOD. This is particularly true
if sequestration is necessary and equal percentage cuts in
budget authority are ordered to reduce outlays.
An example of sequestration is perhaps the best means
for explaining its potential effects. The scenario
presented here assumes that both procurement and operation &
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maintenance have a budget of $150 billion each and that an
outlay reduction of $1 billion is desired. First year
spend-out rates of 15% for procurement and 74% for
operations and maintenance taken from Table 5 means that a
total of $133.5 billion (0.15 * $150B + 0.74 * $150B =
$133. 5B) will be spent in the first year. This translates
into cutting $2.25 in budget authority to achieve a $1
reduction in outlays ($300 billion budget authority/ $13 3 .
5
billion first year expenditure = $2.25). Taking the $1
billion in desired outlay reductions and converting that to
budget authority means $2.25 billion in budget authority
would be reduced ($1 billion * $2.25). If both appropria-
tions are reduced equally in budget authority, the $2.25
billion is divided in half, leaving approximately $1.12
billion for each account. Using the spend-out rates of 15%
for procurement and 74% for operations and maintenance means
that outlays would be cut $168 million (0.15 * $1.12b) for
procurement and $832 million (0.74 * $1.12b) for O&M - to
achieve the $1 billion reduction. The procurement account
has to be cut to compensate for the difference between the
$832M and $168M, or $664M in outyears, unless spending
authority is restored by legislation.
Fast money accounts such as O&M and military personnel
are more vulnerable in the short term than slow money
accounts, such as procurement, if sequestration is enacted.
Navy Undersecretary Conn, indicated in a speech at the Naval
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Postgraduate School on 19 April 1988 that Congress is
unlikely to let sequestration take place in an election year
[Conn 1988]. The time for a decision on whether sequestra-
tion is necessary for the FY89 budget is rapidly
approaching—August 1988. However, before Congress can
concern themselves with the August deficit predictions for
sequestration, they must reach agreement on their budget
resolutions. Outlay and budget authority caps were
established for both domestic and defense programs for FY88
and FY89. Because of differences in opinion as to where the
available funds should be allocated "...Budget committee
leaders are discussing ways around the summit agreement's
limits." [Rapp 1988 no. 11, p. 628] Majority Leader T.S.
Foley, the chairman of the 1987 summit conference,
encouraged a focus on outlays vice budget authority. He
told the budget committee, "It might be necessary to raise
the budget authority level." [Rapp 1988 no. 11, p. 628]
This argument was countered by Republican B. Gradison, who
contended that, "We've got a statute to worry about. We'd
be trying to sail without a rudder if we got away from the
written summit, as translated into the reconciliation
legislation." [Congressional Quarterly 1988D, p. 727]
The summit puts a cap on "discretionary" funding for
non-defense programs. In another attempt to circumvent G-R-
H and the summit agreement, several Congressmen are trying
to change the definition of revolving accounts from
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"discretionary 11 to "mandatory" spending [Rapp 1988 no. 13,
p. 768]. This would free up approximately $3.5 billion in
budget authority reserved for these accounts, thus enabling
budget committees to accommodate demands in other areas and
still remain within the summit cap for budget authority.
With tighter budget restrictions, Congress is telling
agencies to "absorb it" rather than augmenting appropriation
accounts. Congress approved additional funding to support
//
Persian Gulf operations in FY87, but provided no augmenta-
tion for FY88. Congress passed a pay raise for defense in
the FY88 budget, but did not supply full funding [Conn
1988] . The consequence of this was a projected $285 million
shortfall for the Navy personnel account [Conn 1988].
Another example is a policy assumption in a non-binding
House Resolution passed on 23 March 1988 which proposed,
...a 3% pay raise for military and civilian employees,
effective January 1989, with 50 percent of the cost
absorbed by the agencies. The recommendation assumes that
the 50 percent absorption is distributed through all
accounts, [Congressional Quarterly 1988C, p. 769]
The problem with "absorb it" directives or across-the-
board cuts is that:
...efficient organizations are likely to be penalized more
than their poorly performing peers because they will be
forced to make, much tougher decisions about who, what, and
how cuts will be distributed. .. .There are few rewards for
conserving resources in public management. Too often, to
conserve is to be irrational. In many agencies there are
substantial disincentives against saving or underspending
resources. ... Frugality does not bring personal rewards or
more resources for their programs. Instead, more often
than not, they are indirectly penalized because the
resources they save will likely be used to make up
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deficits incurred by other less efficient and self-
sacrificing units and managers. . .managers must be shown
that saving has rewards. . .this will reguire fundamental
reforms in budgeting and personnel practices. [Levine
1980, p. 309]
In March 1988, President Reagan proposed an increase to
DOD's general transfer authority from $1.5 billion to $4
billion [Congressional Quarterly 1988E, p. 727]. This would
provide the budget flexibility needed when the "absorb it"
philosophy is employed in Congress. Secretary Conn said
that this particular measure was dead on arrival at
Congress, because of fears that more money would be
transferred to fast money accounts, thereby increasing the
deficit gap [Conn 1988]. The inability to transfer suffi-
cient funding has caused shortages in both personnel and
operations and maintenance accounts, both of which have had
to absorb unplanned contingencies [Conn 1988]. Since this
thesis uses the flight hour program as an example, it is
important to observe trends in budgeting for the operations
and maintenance appropriation.
E. OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE UNDER G-R-H
On the basis of information presented thus far, one
would think that O&M funds are prime for cutbacks. As a
fast money account, it has a high spend-out rate, therefore
enabling DOD to get substantial reductions in outlay for
every $1 cancelled in budget authority. It generally is
assumed that there is also less pork barrel politics
involved with O&M funds than procurement or military
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construction, which would make it politically vulnerable.
There is no obvious flow of funds from O&M accounts to
Congressional districts. Why protect O&M in a time of
budget restraint?
Joshua Epstein's testimony before the House Budget
Committee on 14 September 1987 discusses the choices between
O&M and hardware: [U.S. Congress 1987D, pp. 13-14]
The traditional preference of the military services in
peacetime, a preference shared by the Reagan
administration, has been to emphasize investment,
expanding or modernizing the force (or both) , and giving
research and development (R&D) efforts a "head of
budgetary steam" to ensure against an uncertain future.
The impulse is to "get while the getting is good."
"Technology," runs the argument, "is America's strength.
In a crunch, people and readiness--the core of the
Operations & Support (O&S) accounts—can be quickly
obtained. If freeze we must, the O&S-intensive option is
best*
"
One risk inherent in this approach is that the ability
of U.S» military forces to deter aggression may weaken if
tomorrow's big-ticket items are funded at the expense of
today's combat effectiveness (a function of readiness,
skill, sustainability, and other factors largely funded
under O&S) . If the world is a volatile place, then
perhaps the marginal dollar should be allocated to reduce
immediate risk, by emphasizing readiness. Moreover,
military modernization itself has called a basic premise
of the 0&S-=intensive school into question: it is not
clear that both readiness and appropriate people can be
obtained quickly in a crisis. High technology requires
high skill, and high skill cannot be acquired quickly.
In a report by the Senate Armed Services Committee,
concern was expressed that, " . . . DOD is not spending enough
on the operating portion of its budget—including pay and
non-pay operating costs--instead is spending too much on the
remaining part of the budget that pays for investment."
[U.S. Congress 1987D, p. 9] A comparison of operating funds
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versus investment or procurement funds between 1980 and 1988
shows that investment increased 82% in real growth vice a
2 5% increase for operating funds. Another comparison shows
that between 1960 and 1980, operating costs consumed 55% to
68% of DOD's budget. During the 1980 's the percentage has
stayed on the lower end, reflecting the DOD spending
emphasis on procurement [U.S. Congress 1987D, p. 133].
Some comfort can be taken in the fact that there is a
general movement at all levels of DOD and selectively in
Congress to protect the readiness achievements the military
has made since 1980. In DOD's budget submission for FY89,
funds requested for O&M increased 2.4% in real terms over
the FY88 appropriation while procurement declined 4.3% and
R&D remained even.
By cutting proportionally twice as much from parts of the
budget that fund hardware as from the O&M request,
Secretary Carlucci accommodates the complaint that
Secretary Weinberger funded new weapons at the expense of
training the troops and maintaining the equipment already
deployed. [Congressional Quarterly 1988A, p. 343]
While FY89 O&M funds requested show an increase, the
President's budget "request" is usually modified in
Congress. In FY88, DOD O&M fell in Congress from a
requested amount of $86 billion to $80.3 billion, a 4.8%
decrease in real growth from FY87 [Towell 1988 no. 2, p.
57] . The risk is increased for the Navy because the general
feeling in Congress is that the Navy has been doing better
than the other services. This is best reflected in a 24
February 1987 statement by the senior Republican member of
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the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Dickinson,
when he said, "If anybody's living in fat city, it's been
the Navy for the past few years." [Towell 1988 no. 9, p.
522]
Concerned that the forces in the field be fully trained,
Secretary Carlucci,
...allowed each service to fully budget for its [FY89]
recommended "operating tempos"—the number of hours per
month that pilots would fly, the number of days per
quarter that ships would be at sea, and the number of
miles per year that tanks and other combat vehicles would
be driven. [Towell 1988 no. 9, p. 523]
Flying hours per crew per month for Navy and Marine Corps
has averaged close to 25 hours for every year since 1980
[U.S. Congress 1987B, p. 672]. Mission capability (MC)
averages for Navy aircraft have increased from 59% in FY80
to 74% in FY86 [U.S. Congress 1987B, p. 648].
Instead of trying to do more with less, Secretary
Carlucci made a decision to reduce the number of units in
the field to maintain high combat readiness. This resulted
in the highly publicized decision to retire 16 frigates,
disband two Air Force wings and one Navy air wing, plus
assorted other reductions in DOD [Towell 1988 no. 9, p.
523] .
The primary difficulty with O&M funds is that when
agencies are asked to absorb costs, the O&M account is a
likely target. Given the presence of Gramm-Rudman
,
Secretary Conn said that if anything is added to the budget
in Congress something also has to come out [Conn 1988]. The
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budget resolution process in Congress also requires this be
done. Also, if the cost of the Persian Gulf must be
absorbed in the O&M account, other sectors of the military
are going to sacrifice some degree of readiness. Currently,
the Persian Gulf operations are running $25 million per
month [Conn 1988].
F. CONCLUSIONS
Regarding the likely effects of G-R-H, former
Congressional Budget Office Chief Rudolph G. Penner
summarized the feelings of those familiar with the politics
of Congress, "My own gut feeling is that they'll get around
Gramm-Rudman . How they bury that critter, that's what's
unclear." [Cranford 1988 no. 8, p. 338]
Congress is under some pressure from constituents and
the financial markets to get the finances of the government
back on track. From this perspective, it will be difficult
to ignore Gramm-Rudman requirements. However, as expected
by many, Congress is using every available tool to keep from
being backed in a corner and forced into sequestration.
Some of the maneuvering includes items previously discussed
such as ignoring pessimistic forecast of the economy and
changing the definitions of spending categories.
The true test of Gramm-Rudman will be between August of
1988 and December 1989. Sequestration is likely to be
avoided during this election year, but the size of the
deficit for FY88 will be apparent before the beginning of
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FY89. A change in interest rates, an important variable for
a debtor nation, could change the optimistic FY89 revenue
forecast as well.
The budget constraints experienced in FY88 may be only
the tip of the iceberg. Regardless of whether G-R-H stays
on track, most segments of the military are going to have
smaller budgets and will have to make some choices about
what programs they are going to continue to support. "As
defense budgets continue to tighten, we need to know what
our priorities must be and what programs may be beyond our
ability to afford." [U.S. Congress 1987D, p. 2]
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IV. FINANCIAL STRESS AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL
A. INTRODUCTION
No government can incur deficits indefinitely . . . .The
increasing gap between revenues and expenditures creates
stress which in turn creates change in the policies and
processes of government. .. .Financial stress impacts most
directly on the processes of budgeting and financial
management. [Levine and Rubin 198 0, pp. 14,17]
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is the government policy change
that has been created to deal with a federal deficit that is
regarded by many as out of control . This chapter examines a
variety of factors that impact the decision process for an
organization subjected to financial stress and constraints,
in this case imposed by deficit control legislation. A
model is presented to describe the phases of recognition of
financial stress and a typical organizational reaction. As
mentioned earlier, most managers have minimal experience
with cutback management. Criteria are not well established
for "...making and implementing hard decisions about which
programs will be scaled down or terminated and which clients
will be asked to make sacrifices." [Levine, 1980, p. 11]
This chapter provides several alternatives for the manager
who is forced to make strategic decisions on how to best
deal with a shortage of funds.
An aspect of management that impairs the ability of
federal executives to make optimal economic choices is the
difficulty of managing a non-profit organization. The
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federal government is the largest non-profit organization in
the country. With that distinction comes a host of
characteristics that make management control a unique
problem when compared to a profit oriented company.
Previous theses have compared the management control of the
flight hour program to a model management control system
[Bozin 1981; Burton 1982; Murray 1986]. This thesis
concentrates on specific characteristics of nonprofit
organizations that military leaders need to understand and
then relates these to flight hour management and budgeting.
Literature on management control provides insight into
problems unique to government organizations.
B. FINANCIAL STRESS
Terms such as financial stress, cutback management,
retrenchment, efficiency, accuracy, austerity and program
termination become prevalent in a period of constrained
resources . The importance attached to these phrases is a
function of the time period an organization can expect
resources to be scarce. Jones noted that, "...prudent
managers will attempt to define the seriousness of the
financial crisis." [Jones 1984, p. 50] Almost any
organization can endure short-term shortfalls of funding
which is referred to as a financial crisis. But what are
the alternatives for an organization faced with financial
stress, a phrase which Jones defines as a "...state in which
difficulty is experienced in balancing revenues and
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expenditures over a long period of time...." [Jones 1984,
p. 51]
Levine notes that:
...usual remedies proposed for dealing with fiscal stress
are reductions in expenditures, economies in staffing,
more accurate accounting, tighter estimates, and an effort
to demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness in the use of
public money. Financial authorities are urged to
strengthen the basic features of public budgeting as a
means to control expenditures, restore public confidence,
and set public finances on a firmer footing. [Levine and
Rubin 1980, p. 143]
He also said that during retrenchment the relationship
between the allocator and organizations receiving funds
becomes strained. Allocators will:
...(1) allocate less to various places and activities (2)
lower their output expectations, and (3) try to get those
to whom they allocate to operate more efficiently.
[Levine and Rubin 1980, p. 9]
The organizations receiving an allocation respond by:
...(1) seeking to be allocated at least as much as they
have been (2) arguing they cannot or should not lower
their output expectations, but eventually doing so to
avoid the frustrations of too wide a gap between goals and
achievement, and (3) arguing they are operating as
efficiently as they can, but simultaneously seeking to be
more efficient so as to minimize the output effects of the
input reductions. [Levine and Rubin 1980, p. 9]
In an article on phases of recognition and management of
financial crisis in public organizations, Jones presents a
model that is useful for identifying various phases of
financial stress for a public organization [Jones 1984, p.
52]. The model may be used for forecasting the reaction of
government and military organizations to Gramm-Rudman
initiatives. If deficit reduction legislation lasts through
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the mid-1990s, "long-term austerity" would best describe
the government's financial horizons. This category is
defined by Jones as a, "...condition where revenues and
expenditures are constrained in constant dollars relative to
previous patterns of growth for a period of five years or
longer." [Jones 1984, p. 50] There are few situations
that exactly follow the events described in model, but it is
the closest representation of reality when considering the
important variables in financial stress. Some of the
material was intentionally deleted from the model because it
pertained more to non-defense organizations in federal,
state and local government. The model for recognition and
management of financial crisis in public organizations is as
follows: [Jones 1984, pp. 52-55] 1
Timing and Phase Events (under assumption that
degree of revenues continue to be reduced through
scarcity phase 7)
6 months 1. Ignoring that a real crisis exists;
moderate reduction in expenditures;
crisis termed "only temporary."
to 2 . Short-term across-the-board spending
cuts made and attempts to increase
revenue from existing sources
instituted.
2nd year 3. Recognition that crisis may persist
for longer period (more than one
year) ; casting the blame for causes
of the crisis; ad hoc "invisible"
expenditure reductions (e.g., in
capital plant maintenance)
.

























reduction; salary and hiring freezes
imposed; efficiency-oriented program
cost studies instituted; mandated
programs examined for reduction.
Across-the-board reductions contin-
ued, accompanied by additional reduc-
tions in specific programs; some
employee layoffs occur; program and
policy evaluation undertaken more
seriously; "hit lists" of programs
for possible termination developed
based upon traditional organizational
criteria; Employee training and
development reduced further or
eliminated.
Across-the-board and specific program
reductions; specific programs are
terminated with some functions
absorbed by other units; employee
morale and productivity drops; some
skilled and highly valued employees
seek jobs outside the organization;
organization heads recognize need for
better and more comparable program
information.
Further program terminations dis-
cussed or implemented; leaders recog-
nize need for longer-term strategic
planning to integrate program and
financial strategies; need for
restoring some expenditures recog-
nized (physical plant maintenance and
capital investment, employee train-
ing) ; program priorities and decision
criteria established.
Development and implementation of
long-term program and financial
planning; organization missions and
objectives renegotiated; continued
austerity conditions accepted.
Implementation of program and finan-
cial plans; reorganization of func-
tions and responsibilities
undertaken; revenues and expenditures
balanced for one or two successive
years. Employee productivity and
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morale improved; confidence in
leadership strengthened.
Beyond 5th 10. Revenues and expenditures balanced
year over multi-year period; improvements
made in integration of program and




Direct parallels can be drawn between this model and the
Department of Defense's response to Gramm-Rudman and
attempts to control the deficit. Table 6 compares the
administration's budget predictions for FY88 and FY89 based
on the prediction in the FY8 6 budget and the summit in
November 1987. Projecting continued growth demonstrates
both DOD's and the administration's initial resistance to
accept any probability of demand for deficit reduction.
TABLE 6
DOD BUDGET PREDICTIONS FOR FY88 & FY89
FY88 FY89
Budget Authority:
FY86 Prediction $411.6 $448.9
1988 Summit Agreement 292.0 299.5
Sources: [Kaufman 1986, p. 3; U.S. Congress 1987E:
Errata]
The 1984 legislation and seguestration Gramm-Rudman
implementation in early 1986 was a short-lived attempt to
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gain control of the deficit. The Supreme Court ruling that
overturned this law gave most politicians in Washington a
feeling of relief and an opportunity to avoid the deficit
problem. As noted by Jones, the
...retrenchment game is not particularly attractive to
politicians no longer able to reward constituents, to
public managers trying to preserve their programs and
jobs, or to citizens benefitting from the services of
government. [Jones 1984, p. 49]
The tendency for politicians is to "...avoid thinking about
retrenchment because outcomes are likely to displease great
numbers of citizens and political actors." [Jones 1984, p.
49]
While Congress was debating proposals for an enactment
of the Gramm-Rudman Deficit Control Act, DOD was starting to
make cuts in support areas that would not be immediately
noticeable. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee during March 1987, Secretary Weinberger was asked
by Senator Kennedy to explain a 37% reduction in requests
for spare parts. Senator Kennedy was concerned that "vital
needs" projected for FY88 during FY8 6 and FY87 budget
submissions were no longer valid. Secretary Weinberger's
response was that DOD had "...a lot of needs and priorities
that are basically equal. If there are severe reductions
from Congress, a lot of very good, necessary programs are
going to suffer. That is what has happened." [U.S. Congress
1987A, p. 297] According to step 3 in the model, this is
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one of the first indications that fiscal stress may be more
than temporary.
Approximately two years after the first Gramm-Rudman law
passed, its successor became law in September 1987.
Sequestration was ordered because of Congress* inaction, the
stock market adjusted, and Washington assumed that the
financial markets and the public were serious about deficit
control. Congressional parties blame each other for the
poor state of the economy with the Democrats saying that,
"the country has ignored insistent warning signals beneath
the economy's surface which could lead to big troubles
ahead." [Cranford 1988 no. 17, p. 1066] These events
support step 3 of the model and the recognition that
financial stress is more than a passing event.
Secretary Carlucci requested that 18 weapons programs be
killed for FY89, air wings eliminated in the Air Force and
Navy, and that the number of military personnel be reduced.
These are a few of the initiatives supporting the model in
the one to three year time period.
Provided that Congress stays with Gramm-Rudman initia-
tives, the rest of the model is plausible. The government
is only in the early stages of financial constraint with
respect to both the timing for Gramm-Rudman implementation
and the model. If the model holds true, significant program
and across-the-board cuts are going to become necessary
before the full cycle is completed, the budget balanced, and
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public confidence restored. Although the upper echelons of
the military disapprove of readiness, training and personnel
program cutbacks, financial choices may dictate cuts in
these areas. William Kaufmann, a research analyst for the
Brookings Institute, has written that, "...the main burden
of reductions will probably fall on pay and readiness. 11
[Kaufman 1986, p. 34] As for the training, Jones contends
that,
...one of the first areas of the budget reduced when
revenues fall short is personnel training. In the short-
term training may be postponed, but elimination of
training is likely to have a serious impact on
productivity, especially when new systems and equipment
are purchased. Without the capability of providing
guidance and incentives through training and development,
employee morale suffers and potentially valuable human
resources are likely to be lost to other organizations.
[Jones 1984, p. 62]
At the CPWP level, the model is equally applicable.
During FY86 and FY87, little impact was felt from Gramm-
Rudman. Both material and aircrew readiness remained high.
In FY88, however, financial constraints became more
apparent. The flight hour program, which upper levels of
DOD and the Navy tried to protect from budget cuts, started
to feel the effects of Gramm-Rudman [Conn 1988]. CPWP
squadrons flew approximately 81,000 hours in FY87. However,
the initial planning figure for FY88 was 70,000 hours. At
mid-year, CPWP was informed of further reductions for the
remainder of FY88 [Bruner 1988]. Regardless of the intent
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to maintain a flight hour program that is immune to Gramm-
Rudman, avoidance of a reduction appears to be virtually
impossible.
C. ACROSS-THE-BOARD VS. PROGRAM CUTS
The financial stress model in the previous section
indicated the necessity of choice in cutback management
between across-the-board and program cuts. The literature
is mixed on which alternative to choose and under what
circumstances each should be applied.
In the early stages of a financial crisis, there is
general agreement that some phenomenon take place.
According to Jones' model and to the "Tooth Fairy Syndrome"
discussed by Levine,
. . . in the initial stages of contractions few people are
willing to believe that the talk of cuts is for real or
that the cuts will be permanent. Initial prevailing
attitude in the organization will usually be optimistic,
that the decline is temporary and that the cuts will be
restored soon--by the tooth fairy. [Levine 1980, p. 307]
Both Jones and Levine indicate that there is often an
attempt to avoid making hard decisions on program cuts
[Jones 1984, p. 55]. To reduce conflict across-the-board
cuts are made. Public organizations and employees prefer
the sharing the pain approach where budget cuts are
allocated across-the-board for operating funds and the work
force is managed by attrition [Jones 1984, p. 56; Levine
1980, p. 310]. Levine concludes that while sharing the pain
may be expedient, easier to justify, helps maintain morale,
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appeals to the common sense ideals of justice, and builds
good team spirit in the organization; it is not responsible
management . Not every unit in an organization contributes
equally to the goals, purposes and basic functions of the
organization [Levine 1980, p. 310]. For CPWP, the choice
does not involve "units," because all squadrons have the
same function. The argument should center on "programs"
because they all do not contribute equally to the primary
missions.
As the model predicts, if an austere condition persists
long enough, some program termination becomes unavoidable.
Levine supports the same perception, when he says that
"...some leadership will emerge to identify and rank
priorities—then allocate the cuts based on the priorities."
[Levine 1980, p. 310] Program termination is by far the
hardest of the cutback alternatives to implement. Making
economic choices among programs requires an extensive
information base capable of identifying the cost of
programs. This is where a focus for the organization is
important. Although establishing a focus sounds easy,
"...most managers in public organizations do not think in
terms of a focus for the organization." [Hosmer 1982, p.
426] The programs at the core of the organization or, in
other words, the ones most central to the mission of the
organization are a starting point for economic analysis.
While it is difficult in a military organization to
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establish any cost-benefit relationship or to measure
effectiveness for these programs, there is a "critical mass"
level within each one. Jones describes this resource level
as a minimum below which the program cannot operate and
still achieve their objectives satisfactorily [Jones 1984,
p. 56] . An easy case in point would be the minimum cost
required to ensure that pilots achieve the number of hours
required for designation prior to specific time gates. For
instance, before designation as a plane commander, pilots
must have 800 hours of pilot time. A more difficult, but
equally important calculation would be the critical mass
hours required in antisubmarine warfare, surveillance, or
antisurface programs, below which the force is not able to
maintain the desired level of readiness. For programs not
central to the focus or mission of the organization, it is
not as much a question of critical mass as it is of whether
to totally eliminate the program. This is the point where
knowing the cost of programs and how much could be saved to
meet a specific cutback target is important.
When program termination becomes necessary, the best
approach is to explain termination decisions openly [Jones
1984, p. 58]. Every program has its defenders; therefore,
the mere mention of program termination requires that the
decision-maker have well-defined criteria on which to defend
his position. This may be based on an organization's
mission, or the cost relative to the importance of the
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mission, or a reorganization of focus for the organization.
As Jones noted,
...in the heat of battle that usually characterizes
program termination, managers may begin to recognize that
in order to defend their decisions internally and
externally, there is need for more careful development of
cutback criteria, priorities, and procedures. [Jones
1984, p. 59]
One decision-making process for cutbacks that Levine
thinks should be avoided is described in his "participation
paradox*
"
...a field of organizational development teaches that the
best way to manage changes is to encourage the maximum
amount of participation by all parties. But, a rational
cutback process will require that some people and programs
be asked to take greater cuts than others. By encouraging
participation, management also encourages protective
behavior by those most likely to be hurt the most—
insolvable problem for management, therefore across-the-
board cuts are made to avoid deadlocks or rancorous
conflict. [Levine 1980, p. 308]
As financial resources tighten, the centralization of
decision-making also can be expected to tighten. Jones
notes that while the dominant form of authority structure
employed in a financial crisis is centralized decision-
making, the degree of control is not as important as,
...(1) smoothing the impact of cuts, (2) continuity of
leadership, (3) the extent to which crisis management is
politicized, (4) ability to define organizational mission
and goals, and (5) extent to which priorities are
established and budgeted. [Jones 1984, p. 60]
Levine and Rubin contended that "declines in revenue tended
to accelerate the centralization of executive control
over. . .budgetary processes." [Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian
1981, p. 203]
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D. MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Since a nonprofit organization lacks the semiautomatic
control that is provided by the profit mechanism, it needs
a good management control system even more than business
does. [Anthony and Young 1984, p. 57]
The federal government is the largest nonprofit
organization in the country [Anthony and Young 1984, p. 37].
Management control in a military organization is different
than in a profit oriented company for a number of reasons,
the most important of which are discussed in this section of
the chapter.
There are various definitions of management control, but
the one Anthony, Dearden and Bedford use is "...the system
used to do such things as collect and analyze information,
evaluate it, and use it and other devices to control
activities." [Anthony, Dearden and Bedford 1984, p. 5]
Two important concepts to remember in discussing management
control are that: (1) it is "...positive and aims to
encourage, assist, and motivate managers and workers to
implement organization strategies and to follow organization
policies in the process" [Anthony, Dearden and Bedford 1984,
p. 23], and (2) with few exceptions, "...management control
systems are built around a financial structure." [Anthony
and Young 1984, p. 13]
The four principal steps in a formal management control
system are: (1) programming, (2) budget formulation, (3)
operating & measurement, and (4) reporting & evaluation
[Anthony and Young 1984, p. 10]. These steps have been
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analyzed and compared to models in previous theses [Bozin
1981; Burton 1982; Murray 1986]. The purpose in this thesis
is to look at some of these functions in terms of a
nonprofit organization.
There are several types of nonprofit organizations. A
client supported nonprofit organization receives revenues
from clients and the goal is to increase the size of the
organization by increasing the clientele—an example would
be a port authority or airport. On the other side is the
public supported nonprofit organization which involves most
federal agencies, including the military. They depend
entirely on a fixed appropriation process for financial
resources. In this case, a new client or responsibility
represents a burden on the fixed resources; therefore, a
negative attitude often develops toward increased
responsibilities or clients. This is a reason for
complaints about poor service and the sometimes surly
attitude of bureaucrats—very few "thank yous" and "pleases"
if the client does not represent a potential benefit
[Anthony and Young 1984, p. 14].
A listing of the characteristics and a model of a
nonprofit organization will provide a basis for discussing
the aspects that make management control a difficult
proposition. The nine characteristics that distinguish a
nonprofit organization are: [Anthony and Young 1984, p. 38]
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1. Absence of a profit measure
2
.
Tendency to be service organizations
3. Constraints on goals and strategies
4. Less dependence on clients for $ support
5. The dominance of professionals
6. Differences in governance
7. Difference in top management
8. Importance of political influences







































Source: Adapted from [Hosmer 1982, p. 422]
Figure 3 . Model of Nonprofit Organization
The list of characteristics and the model define some
relationships that are unique to nonprofit organizations.
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The most highly publicized difference between a business and
a public supported nonprofit organization is the lack of a
profit motive. Anthony and Young say that:
The absence of a single, satisfactory, overall measure
of performance that is comparable to the profit measure is
the most serious problem inhibiting the development of
effective management control systems in nonprofit
organizations. ... In most situations, the ideal financial
performance is a break-even one. [Anthony and Young 1984,
p. 39]
Competition for clients in a free market encourages the
most efficient use of resources or the firm will not
survive.
If a competitive industry permits its cost to get out of
control, its product line to become out of fashion, or its
quality to decrease, its profits will decline. A public
supported organization has no such automatic danger
signal. [Anthony, Dearden and Bedford 1984, p. 13]
As mentioned previously, "...as a substitute for the market
mechanism for allocating resources, managers compete with
one another for available resources." [Anthony and Young
1984, p. 15] Program costs are easily determined, but it is
hard to relate the cost to the output in determining a cost-
benefit relationship or the optimum allocation of resources.
In an aviation squadron, it is particularly difficult to
emphasize minimizing cost for flights because of safety, an
overriding factor in any cost control or efficiency
programs. This is particularly true for pilots without much
experience, because efficiency programs can become
competitive between pilots and reduce safety margins to
unacceptable levels. Over-emphasis on saving a little on
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aircraft fuel by being more efficient could result in the
loss of an airplane and its crew. In a squadron there are
definite boundaries to reducing cost. Efficiency in the
flight hour program centers more around planning for flights
so that maximum training is achieved for the resources
expended.
The success of a corporation is measured by management '
s
ability to maximize stockholder wealth, which means
maximizing the price of the common stock through improved
earnings [Brigham and Gapenski 1988, p. 11]. The success of
a nonprofit organization is generally supposed to be
measured by how well they provide a service. A measure of
performance for services is much more difficult than profit.
In fact, to quantify and measure the output and success of a
public supported nonprofit organization is almost
impossible. Hosmer supported that statement when he noted
it is
...difficult to evaluate the performance of organizations
that are providing intangible services to diverse clients
at prices that have a very limited relationship to the
needs of the market or to the costs of the process.
[Hosmer 1982, p. 430]
How successfully a patrol squadron is managed is not
dependent on the ratio of hours of contact time on enemy
submarines to the total number of hours flown. There is no
cost-benefit relationship in tracking submarines.
Because of a lack of objective measures, it is common to
turn to subjective opinions, and to compare prestige, not
the performance, of organizations providing equivalent
services to similar constituencies by parallel methods.
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Opinions on this relative standing may be both subjective
and biased. The evaluator has a point of view that is
either consciously or unconsciously oriented by
professional associations, social values, or personal
ambitions. [Hosmer 1982, p. 9]
Although there have been multiple attempts to quantify the
performance of patrol squadrons, awarding of the Battle "E"
for excellence continues to be partially subject to factors
that cannot be quantified.
As explained by Hosmer, "Control procedures are
primarily oriented toward assigning responsibility for input
spending since output is so variable and unmeasureable.
"
[Hosmer 1982, p. 420] Most organizational units in
government are provided lump sum grants to perform unique
missions with "heterogeneous, hard-to-define and virtually
impossible to measure outputs." [Jones and Thompson 1986,
p. 39] This sometimes leads to a "sense that performance is
not all it might be
—
performance can only be improved by
budget augmentation." [Jones and Thompson 1986, p. 39] The
flight hour program has many of these characteristics. The
financial controls are on the funds allocated to a squadron
and not the services expected to be received for the funds.
For outputs, the squadron commander is entrusted to optimize
readiness with the resources available. There is no
comparison of where the funds were spent to where the PMR
budget formulation process indicates the funds should have
been spent. There is no magic formula or standard of
comparison for resource allocation to the various missions.
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Readiness is the only visible output measure of performance
and it is this variable that somewhat enables the
decentralization of decision-making concerning the proper
utilization of financial resources.
Readiness is the one variable that comes closest to a
profit measure. The measurement of readiness is
considerably more subjective than profit, but it is the best
overall performance indicator available to a squadron. The
following dialogue supports that statement i
The best manager is not the one who generates the most
sales volume, or the one who uses labor most efficiently,
or the one who uses material most efficiently, or the one
who has the best control of overhead, or the one who makes
the best use of capital. Rather, the best manager is the
one who does best on all these activities combined,
therefore, profit is the measure to use. [Anthony,
Dearden and Bedford 1984, p. 748]
There are direct parallels in a squadron for each of these
categories and effective flight hour utilization is only one
of the inputs. This is why it is difficult to draw a direct
relationship between flight hours and readiness.
It is important to differentiate between efficient and
effective use of resources, two criteria that are normally
used in the measurement of performance.
Efficient managers are those who do whatever they do with
the least consumption of resources, but if what they do is
an inadequate contribution to the accomplishment of the
organization's goals, they are ineffective. [Anthony and
Young 1984, p. 20]
"Measures of effectiveness are difficult to come by because
objectives and outputs are difficult to quantify, therefore,
effectiveness, is often expressed in non-quantitative,
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judgmental terms," such as Squadron "A" is doing a first
rate job or Squadron "B" has slipped somewhat in recent
months. [Anthony and Young 1984, p. 18] From a
traditional-technical rational standpoint, quantitative is
favored over qualitative measurement [Euske 1988, p. 7].
However, in squadrons, measurement of effectiveness and
efficiency often depend on expert judgement and qualitative
assessments because of the difficulty in quantitatively
measuring outputs.
Because all 12 squadrons have the same missions, it is
possible to quantitatively compare some aspects of their
performance. Anthony and Young state that:
If the same program structure is to be used by a
number of similar organizations, then great care needs to
be taken to assure that the structure will provide
comparable data so that averages and other measures can be
compiled and individual organizations can compare their
own data with these averages. [Anthony and Young 1984, p.
242]
This is used in patrol squadrons to some extent,
particularly in maintenance. The same principle is
applicable to the amount of resources dedicated annually to
various programs or missions. Because of differences in the
missions of various deployment sites, the resources
dedicated to operational programs cannot be compared. The
training programs; however, should all be similar, so there
are perhaps advantages to collecting that data for
comparison.
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Another aspect concerning nonprofit organizations that
deserves discussion is the predominance of professional
personnel. In a corporation, the executives seldom have any
of the same responsibilities as the newest individual in the
organization. For the corporations, management is a full-
time job. [Anthony and Young 1984, p. 47] That is not true
in a nonprofit organization. The commanding officer of a
squadron always has responsibilities as an aviation officer
on an aircrew just like the youngest aircrewman in the
squadron. "In a professional organization, the professional
qualifications of the people are of primary importance."
[Anthony and Young 1984, p. 17] The professional
responsibilities are an important part of the career of
every naval officer and frequently detract from the ability
to become a top-notch executive in the managerial sense.
The military officer is stuck in the middle between
professional and managerial responsibilities—a part-time
professional and a part-time manager [Hosier 1982, p. 419].
There are several reasons for the emphasis on profes-
sional responsibilities at all levels of the organization.
In a professional organization, promotion is geared to the
criteria established by the profession rather than the
organization and thus may not place emphasis on efficiency
and effectiveness. These criteria do not always reflect
the individual's worth to the organization. Professionals
tend to need a longer time to prove their worth than
managers in profit oriented companies. [Anthony and Young
1984, p. 47]
This again relates to the difficulty of judging performance
in an organization where measurement of outputs is
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difficult. An aviator in a patrol squadron must excel in
his aviation responsibilities and demonstrate superior
leadership ability as a prerequisite to assignment in
desirable managerial positions in the military. The talents
of a sharp manager may never have the opportunity to develop
if there is any problem with professional qualifications.
The characteristics of nonprofit organizations and
management control systems described in this section are
applicable to all military organizations. They were
researched because it is important for leaders in military
organizations to be aware of the differences in managing a
profit and nonprofit organization. Most of the executives
in the military have always worked in a public supported
nonprofit organization where the funding battle is won or
lost in the appropriation process. Once the appropriation
is determined, annual revenues are established and military
leaders must use the available resources to their best
advantage. The market mechanism that establishes a balance
between supply and demand and the economic laws that govern
the success or failure of a profit oriented company
generally are not an important variable for managers in the
military.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter examined topics important for military
managers confronted with extended funding restraints. Hard
decisions are going to be made concerning programs and
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budgets if G-R-H is implemented as designed. The uncertain
nature of the federal budget process combined with deficit
reduction initiatives creates risk for fast money accounts,
such as O&M. The uncertainty of budget prospects for
defense, the threat of sequestration, and the quarterly
funding cycle for O&M could mean financial stress in
military organizations for several years. Organizations can
prepare themselves for such a period by developing better
criteria for budgetary decision-making. Because of
budgetary politics, the time schedule of G-R-H, and the
difficulty of forecasting deficits, the budget is subject to
major changes in a short period. This combination of events
provides little opportunity for long-term planning and can
create almost perpetual chaos.
The important point is that during the initial stages of
cutback management, leaders can establish a focus and long-
term strategy for the organization. "A clear statement of
strategy of a nonprofit organization is needed both for
external information and internal motivation." [Hosmer
1982, p. 423] "Strategic design involves a long-term
concept of service and if properly done, provides a
rationale for the continued existence and further support."
[Hosmer 1982, p. 423] Hosmer notes that:
Future opportunities and risks plus current strengths and
weaknesses serve as boundaries for selecting proper
strategy. Within these boundaries there exist a range of
strategic alternatives. The identification of
alternatives is a creative task that requires imagination,
innovation and perception. These characteristics,
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unfortunately, are often missing at both business and
nonprofit institutions; too many nonprofit organizations
accept existing strategies. [Hosmer 1982, p. 431]
Developing a long-term strategy requires economic choices
concerning program priorities in a cutback environment. The
literature on this topic concludes that the best long-term
alternative is to mix program reductions with terminations
and across-the-board cuts. The choices depend on the timing
and degree of cuts necessary. All programs need to be
carefully reviewed to determine their contribution to the
primary mission of the organization. Programs on the fringe
of the organization's responsibilities need to be costed-out
to determine the resultant savings if elimination is
necessary. Programs at the core of the organization need to
be retained at a critical mass level. Jones notes that at
the point where tough decisions have to be made,
"...organizations typically become aware of how much they
are in need of good program activity and outcome information
organized in a way that enables actual program cost and
benefit comparison." [Jones 1984, p. 59] He goes on to note
that:
...critical at this time is the design and execution of a
planning process that generates accurate and reliable
information to enable internal comparisons between
programs in addition to comparisons with other
organizations. Program data collected in a format that is
applicable to the varied components of the organization
and that permits accurate and valid response is needed.
Managers are generally frustrated to learn the extent to
which they have underinvested in or simply squandered
valuable planning, program evaluation, information
management and other analytical resources in the past.
[Jones 1984, p. 59]
77
V. ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
...major improvements in the government's financial
management systems are needed if decision makers are to
have timely and reliable information as a basis for the
policy choices they must make if they are to avoid
sequestration. [U.S. General Accounting Office 1987A, p.
2]
This statement from GAO on deficit control pertains to
financial management on an agency level, such as the
Department of Defense or the Department of the Navy. This
chapter deals with a lower level of organizational decision-
making, but the statement appears to be germane. This
chapter focuses on the decision support and accounting
system required by the Commander, Patrol Wings Pacific
(CPWP) in an era of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (G-R-H) budget
restraint. CPWP is the decision-maker for allocation of
flight hour funding and should have an accounting and
management information system to support economic choices.
As mentioned in Chapter I, the formal flight hour accounting
system used by the Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Center,
Pacific is not in the scope of this thesis.
This chapter examines some of the factors that should be
considered in improving the capabilities of the financial
and management information systems that support decision-
making. The problems generally experienced in implementing
a new control system are also addressed. It is beyond the
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scope of this thesis to develop specific requirements for
the management information system (MIS) discussed in this
chapter. At the time of research for this thesis, CPWP had
received a contractor proposal to develop a system to
standardize data collection and provide the information
needed to better manage the flight hour program. Funding
for such a project may not be possible in a period of budget
constraints. Levine notes that this sort of problem is not
unusual for organizations:
When slack resources abound, money for the development
of management planning, control, information systems, and
the conduct of policy analysis is plentiful even though
these systems are relatively irrelevant to decision-
making. Under conditions of abundance; habit, intuition,
snap judgments, and other forms of informal analysis will
suffice for most decisions because the costs of making
mistakes can be easily absorbed without threatening the
organization's survival.
In times of austerity, however, when these control and
analytic tools are needed to help minimize the risk of
making mistakes, the money for their development and
implementation is unavailable. [Levine 1980, p. 15]
CPWP has historically collected the number of hours
expended on various programs and has assembled a data base.
To determine program cost, the annual funded cost per hour
for all programs is applied to the hours flown for a
particular category. This chapter analyzes the data from P-
3C flights to determine if the variance in cost per hour
between programs is significantly different from the average
that is used. This information helps in not only
determining the cost of programs more accurately, but would
help manage the flight hour program on a squadron level,
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particularly if program funding was reduced while mission
requirements were maintained at a constant level or
increased.
Another area requiring discussion is the problem many
organizations experience in establishing management
information systems. In the computer age, it is easy to
collect data, but deciding what data is needed is frequently
a difficult assessment. A GAO report entitled, "Managing
the Cost of Government: Building an Effective Management
Structure," summarizes the quality of information collected
by noting in the opening paragraph that, "Today's financial
reports provide a flood of information. All too often, the
financial data in those reports are inconsistent, incom-
plete, unreliable, and untimely." [U.S. General Accounting
Office 1985B, p. 1]
Studies of managers and the relationship between
information systems and decision-making provide interesting
insights into this problem. The conclusions of research in
these areas are important for public managers entrusted with
decisions on the allocation of resources. The last part of
this chapter reviews this research because a demand for
better decisions and more information is frequently a by-
product of prolonged financial stress.
B. ACCOUNTING AND PROGRAM STRUCTURE
The choices among some major alternative programs, as
well as final determination of their levels, are almost
inevitably incidental to the budgeting process and require
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costing prior to choice. Moreover, the generation of
reliable cost data in the form needed for guantitative
economic analysis reguires that accounts be kept in a form
that permits their ready consolidation into meaningful
end-product program categories. Broad classification of
expenditures by account titles gives little help either in
choosing program levels or in seeking efficiency within
programs. [Hitch and McKean 1986, pp. 234, 254]
Concern appears to be widespread that current financial
reporting systems are not providing the information needed
for effective decision-making. The President's FY88 report
on the management of the United States concluded that
"... financial management information is inadeguate for
general management purposes with large gaps in information
on cash flows, program and administrative costs, property
and outstanding debt." [U.S. General Accounting Office
1987B, p. 35] A GAO report further stated that:
Controlling the cost of government reguires knowing
what government services and programs cost and why. But
today's financial reports do not paint a clear picture of
those costs. They focus instead on obligations (when an
item is ordered) and on outlays (when a bill is paid) .
Both are important, but neither is a consistently reliable
measure of the resources being consumed (costs) in
carrying out government programs. [U.S. Government
Accounting Office 1985A, p. 4]
The previous paragraph discloses only three of many
reasons for accounting system revision? all three emphasize
the importance of establishing a program structure.
Information from the program structure is needed for the
following reasons: "...(1) to facilitate decision-making
about programs, (2) to provide a basis of comparison of the
costs and outputs of similar programs, and (3) to collect
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financial information for reporting purposes." [Anthony and
Young 1984, p. 24]
The opening paragraph of this thesis explained an
accounting method that focuses on end-product missions or
programs vice classes of objects. Classes of objects are
personnel, supplies, fuel, rent, etc. "A structure arranged
by type of resources. .. [such as the objects mentioned
above]... is not a useful program structure." [Anthony,
Dearden and Bedford 1984, p. 759] The definition of
program depends on what level of government is considered.
A program structure may be developed for various levels in
an organization the size of DOD.
At the top are a relatively few major programs. At the
bottom are a great many program elements; these are the
smallest units in which information is collected in
program terms. In between are summaries of related
program elements; program categories . [Anthony, Dearden
and Bedford 1984, p. 759]
The program system envisioned by GAO involves a "roll-
up" of budgeted and actual program costs with a tabulation
of variances [U.S. General Accounting Office 1985B, p. 32].
Within the military hierarchy, "detailed budget and
accounting transactions are coded starting with the lowest
program entity where meaningful management control can be
exercised." [U.S. General Accounting Office 1985B, p. 32]
The information is summarized at each level in the chain of
command until it reaches the top programs—thus the concept
of "rolling-up" program information. GAO organizes the top
programs in national defense (050) as the conventional
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forces, strategic forces, supporting activities, and atomic
energy defense [U.S. General Accounting Office 1985B, p.
33]. DOD's Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS)
has 11 basic programs versus the four discussed by GAO
[Practical Comptrollership Manual 1988, p. A-8]. Every
program in the military is represented in a program element
under one of these programs. To accommodate such a system,
the organization of the coding system becomes an important
variable. Under such a system, according to GAO, it would
be possible to more accurately determine the total amount of
resources dedicated by all military organizations to
antisubmarine warfare, training, or any other program. This
sort of accounting system also might enable the
determination of critical mass levels for basic program
elements such as cost of transportation to and from
deployment locations. However, such determinations
represent a significant degree of development of
programmatic and accounting structures.
Although program information is collected in the flight
hour program, budget execution focuses on object classes—
fuel, consumables for maintaining aircraft, and depot level
repairables. Budget execution of operating target (OPTAR)
is reported on the monthly Budget OPTAR Report (BOR) to
CNAP. GAO ' s concern is that "...except for fund control
purposes, little management attention is paid to comparisons
between budgeted and actual results and the effect variances
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have on current and future budgets." [U.S. General
Accounting Office 1985B, p. 13] GAO defines "fund control"
as:
. . .managing congressional ly appropriated funds
(obligational authority) to ensure that (1) they are used
only for authorized purposes, (2) they are economically
and efficiently used, (3) obligations and disbursements do
not exceed the amounts authorized and available, and (4)
the obligation or disbursement of amounts authorized is
not reserved or otherwise deferred without congressional
knowledge and approval. [U.S. General Accounting Office
1985B, p. 40]
"The budget is normally prepared on a program basis
while the accounting is generally done on an organizational
and object class basis." [U.S. General Accounting Office
1985B, p. 13] Flight hour accounting in the squadron
corresponds to the GAO characterization. The monthly Budget
OPTAR Report (BOR) is an object class report. As mentioned
previously, program performance information is collected;
however, the current system does not enable comparison of
planned and actual program expenditures. Anthony and Young
note that,
The analysis of variances between standard cost and actual
cost according to the cause of the variance is a fairly
recent development although it has been in text for more
than 3 years. Such an analysis provides a powerful
control tool. [Anthony and Young 1984, p. 56]
Generation of variances between planned and actual
expenditures plus comparisons between squadrons could
provide a more realistic updating of the PMR system used in
budget formulation. Variances may also serve as a useful
feedback mechanism for commanding officers concerning the
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allocation of resources, particularly in an era of budget
restraint.
In an assessment of accounting and efficiency, Hopwood
notes that,
Appeals are made to the potential offered by improved
costing procedures, more specific criteria for resource
allocation, improved management information systems,




The word "potential" is key because this argument on
efficiency in accounting notes that while standards,
analyzing variances and measuring outputs are easy concepts
to understand, their implementation is difficult. The
following excerpt from his article is important in
understanding the difficulty of developing variances and
standards of efficiency:
Generality and ambiguity of notions such as efficiency
and value for money must be recognized. The ideas of
comparison of inputs and outputs, and financial resources
with their consequences, the delineation of those inputs,
outputs, resources and consequences remains both a
practically and conceptually difficult endeavor. To date,
accounting for efficiency and value of money have been
advanced in the name of their presumed potential rather




The use of standards and variances goes beyond establishing
a program budgeting system. Anthony and Young contend that,
"The task of designing a program budgeting system is
difficult by itself, but the task of revising an accounting
system is much more difficult
—
perhaps by a factor of 10 or
100." [Anthony and Young 1984, p. 434]
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Enforcing changes in accounting policies designed to
improve financial management has proved to be a frustrating
task. In testimony before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs during July 1987, the Comptroller
General reenforced the financial management concerns he had
made clear in GAO reports published in 1985 [U.S. General
Accounting Office 1987E, p. 3]. He was seeking legislation
to correct financial problems because administrative action
had not brought the necessary changes. He contended that:
Organizations and the people who manage them naturally
resist change. Reform initiatives, whether short-lived or
permanent, represent change. Therefore, it is not
surprising that administrative actions to improve
operations are not fully successful, particularly when
agency personnel perceive that there will be new
directions from succeeding managers. The existence of a
legislative mandate would provide the needed assurance
that an initiative's direction, and indeed its very
existence, would be stable. [U.S. General Accounting
Office 1987E, p. 4]
In times of financial constraint, there is going to be a
persistent effort to improve the government's financial
management. The Comptroller General acknowledged that
. . .billions of dollars are being spent on uncoordinated
efforts to upgrade accounting and financial management
systems, but these efforts have routinely failed to meet
their objectives. I am concerned about our government's
inability to effectively hold federal managers accountable
for their financial activities, generally because we lack
essential financial data. [U.S. General Accounting Office
1987E, p. 1]
Judging from the literature, it appears the first step
in establishing a viable tool for decision-making and
effective management control of flight hour funds is
improvement of program costing. Establishment of variances
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and standards is a follow-on accounting step that, while
difficult in itself, could strengthen overall management
control system usefulness. The following section examines
some of the factors involved in costing of programs, using
the flight hour program as an example.
C. FLIGHT HOUR ACCOUNTING
Establishing a program accounting system may be easier
in aviation squadrons than most other segments of the Navy.
This is because each time an aircrew prepares for a flight,
there is some primary tasking for the flight which can be
categorized into a program. This is not true for a surface
ship which gets underway for months at a time. Determining
the allocation of resources by programs in that case is more
difficult.
The importance of knowing program cost has been
explained. Entering an era of G-R-H where the budgeting
process is going to be volatile, an organization must know
what programs are important and how much they cost. Jones'
model of financial stress indicates that while across-the-
board cuts may suffice for the early phases of financial
constraints, economic choices on programs eventually become
necessary.
CPWP is currently able to estimate the costs of various
programs by using the existing data base of hours and an
average cost per hour. Without a method for collecting
program costs on the squadron level, using an average is the
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only inexpensive alternative available. However, computers
are now available in all squadrons and the ability exists to
develop one standardized system for collection of flight
hour and program costs. Currently, squadron systems for
collecting financial information vary considerably. Some
existing systems record and analyze the cost of each flight
while others only concern themselves with tracking the total
flight costs necessary to meet the object class requirements
of the Budget OPTAR Reports (BOR) . Standardizing data
collection in squadrons may be necessary if CPWP is to get
the financial information needed for decision-making. There
are several factors to consider in initiating such a system.
Aside from the often considerable technical and
budgetary difficulties encountered in developing better
decision support systems for economic choices, organization-
al problems also inhibit progress. Anthony and Young note
that:
Introduction of a new system is a traumatic experience
for managers and others, particularly professionals, at
all levels. [Anthony and Young 1984, p. 593]
Even if operating managers understand that the system
will provide better information, their worries may not be
allayed. Operating managers are part of an organization
hierarchy in which they have both subordinates and
superiors. Operating managers may understand that the new
system will provide them with better information about
what their subordinates are doing, and therefore a better
basis for controlling the efforts of their subordinates,
and this they welcome. But by the same token, they may
perceive that the new system provides better information
to their superiors about what they are doing and gives
superiors a better basis for controlling their efforts,
and this they are not so happy about. [Anthony and Young
1984, p. 601]
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Jones and Thompson acknowledged the existence of this
problem when they noted that:
To avoid making sensitive cost and performance
information available to the controllers, operating
managers frequently appear to deny valuable information to
themselves. High quality information is not developed by
suppliers for fear that this information would be used by
controllers to cut their budgets. [Jones and Thompson
1986, p. 43]
Implementation of initiatives designed to improve financial
management information systems was the same problem the
Comptroller General noted in his testimony to the
Congressional committee. To improve implementation, he
sought legislative action. On an administrative level where
legislative action is not an alternative, Anthony and Young
note that,
The driving force for a new system must come from senior
management and it is unlikely that operating managers will
voluntarily embrace a new system in advance of its
installation, let alone be an enthusiastic advocate.
[Anthony and Young 1984, p. 594]
One of the important parameters defined for a management
control system in Chapter IV is that it must be "...positive
and aim to encourage, assist, and motivate managers to
implement organization strategies and to follow organization
policies in the process." [Anthony, Dearden and Bedford
1984, p. 23] The system should be designed to improve data
collection, including requirements already in existence, so
that it helps management control on a squadron level as well
as for higher commands. Standardization of the requirements
for collecting program information provides a focus for the
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organization, reduces conjecture as to what information is
important or needed, and eliminates the collection of
unnecessary information that previously may have been
required.
Given organizational tendencies to resist change and the
technical problems of implementing computerized information
systems, it is important to determine whether a change is
warranted. Is an average cost per hour sufficient for
costing programs when decisions may have to be made on
program cuts, critical mass levels, and what programs are
achievable with the resources available? To help answer
this question, I examined fuel usage from approximately 2 50
flights to determine if the standard deviation in cost per
hour was significant enough to justify increased accuracy in
program costing. The flight data was provided by VP-5 while
deployed to Sigonella, Sicily in 1988.
The funded cost per hour varies between deployment sites
because of unique "on-top" requirements, e.g., the amount of
fuel required in the aircraft at the completion of a flight
to enable a divert to an alternate airfield. In some cases,
the nearest divert airfield is three hours flying time away.
It costs money to carry extra fuel, which increases the cost
per hour required to operate from some deployment sites.
VP-5 was funded at $453 per hour with fuel (JP-5) priced at
$0.66 per gallon. This equates to 686.4 gallons per hour
assuming that JP-5 is the only gas used. JP-4 at $0.61 per
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gallon is also used by P-3s, but the usage is minimal and
was not considered a significant variable in this problem.
It is important that gallons per hour be used because cost
per hour fluctuates each year with changes in government
fuel contracts. Table 7 is a breakdown of the important
information from the flight data. Appendix C shows a
graphic distribution of the gallons per hour (GPH) versus
flight time for each category.
TABLE 7










Operational 1 616.3 75.7
Surveillance 34 7.3 636.8 132.7
FAM/DFW 23 3.0 648.5 65.2
Maintenance2 19 1.4 692.8 278.0
Airways 3 42 5.5 700.6 76.6










-^Includes all operational and exercise flights, except
low-level surveillance.
2 Includes 3 magnetic anomaly detection (MAD COMP)
compensation flights.
3 Includes transit to deployment.
Source: [Patrol Squadron FIVE 1988]
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Several conclusions may be drawn from this data that
support the need for more detailed program costing. The
difference between the funded gallons per hour (686) and the
flight data's average gallons per hour (635) is 51 gallons
per hour. This 7.5% of the funded gallons represents the
flight fuel used to perform ground evolutions such as ground
maintenance using the aircraft's auxiliary power unit (APU),
engine turn-ups for maintenance, and ready alert preflights.
This sort of information is useful for performing a cost-
benefit analysis in determining whether purchasing ground
power units would be more economical than using the
aircraft's APU. This 7.5% does not include aircraft fuel
consumed by the APU during preflights or postflights—
evolutions where ground support equipment is more efficient.
Currently, the amount of flight fuel expended on ground
functions is not tracked for such analysis.
Significant information obtained from the data is the
standard deviation for the total sample. For example, a
standard deviation of 121 gallons per hour means that 68% of
the flights had fuel usage rates between 514 and 756 gallons
per hour (635 + or - 121) . In percentage terms, this is a
19% deviation from the average gallons per hour.
The graphs in Appendix C provide the distribution of
fuel usage rates. Longer duration flights have a more
efficient fuel usage rate and follow a more predictable
pattern. The graph in Appendix C which includes all
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flights, reveals an extensive distribution in gallons per
hour for those flights below 4.0 hours. Four out of the
five highest consumption rates were maintenance check
flights lasting less than one hour and all had usage rates
exceeding 1100 gallons per hour.
Although not relevant to the variance in gallons per
hour, the graph of total gallons used versus flight time
provides a model for predicting fuel usage based on flight
time. Since there is only one independent variable, a
simple linear regression is appropriate for my analysis of
the data. The computer software uses the data to generate
results in the following equation form: "Y = aX + b" , where
"Y" is the dependent variable and represents total gallons
and "X" is the independent variable, the flight time used.
The constant in the equation is "b" meaningful only within
the relevant range of "X"—minimum to maximum flight time of
the data. The slope of the regression line is the prefix
"a," indicating the unit change in gallons per hour for each
unit change in hours. The equation resulting from linear
regression of the data for the 250 flights is:
Y = (604.27 gallons per hour * X hours) + 209 gallons
Using the equation, a flight of nine hours can be expected
to use 5,647 gallons of fuel, producing the expected value
of "Y." The actual observed value "Ya " will probably be
something slightly different than the predicted 5,647
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gallons. This difference is explained by random error,
deviation, or residual and is a represented by an "e" in the
equation for observed data:
Ya = a + bX + e
The regression equation is a line fitted to the observed
data that minimizes, more than any other line, the sum of
the squared errors. [Liao 1988, p. 3]
The ability to derive an equation from a set of data
does not in itself determine the accuracy of the prediction
model. Statistical relationships determine the quality of
the regression model. Methods for evaluating the regression
are important because they describe the relationship
existing between "Y" and "X." For this particular case, the
analysis is relatively simple because there is only one
independent variable. Regression models typically involve
more than one independent or explanatory variable and the
challenge is to determine the effect that each variable has
on the one dependent variable. Computer software made the
regression of the flight hour data simple. The key to the
usefulness of the result is proper analysis of the output.
[Liao 1988, p. 13]
The regression has a coefficient of determination, R2 =
95.5% which means that 95.5 percent of the sample variation
in total gallons can be explained by the change in hours
[Liao 1988, p. 13]. The standard error of the estimate (Se )
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equals 419 gallons meaning 68% of the observations fall
within plus or minus 419 gallons of the regression line
predicted by the above equation. Ninety-five percent of the
observations fall within 1.64S e or 687 gallons of the
predicted.
Flight hour data bases collected for various deployment
sites would enable the creation of similar regression
models. Such predictive models would be useful to
operations personnel in managing a flight hour budget and to
flight crews in determining the efficiency of their flight.
The are a number of potential uses of improved costing of
flight hour information, particularly if a predictive model
is available by type of mission.
The primary benefit of improving the costing of flight
hours is that the information derived will enable better
utilization and allocation of scarce flight hour resources.
Improving the efficiency with which resources are consumed
is a strategy that increases in importance as resources
become more constrained. Improved mission cost information
can be used on several different levels in the chain of
command to enhance efficiency and decision-making. Squadron
pilots, the operations officer, the squadron commanding
officer, and CPWP, the manager ultimately responsible for
the optimum allocation of flight hour resources, all can use
better information to improve performance, management
control, and decision-making. Prior to discussing the
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potential benefits, it should be noted that there are no
financial analysts or comptrollers assigned to CPWP or any
of its subordinate commands. The comptroller works on the
staff of Commander Naval Air Force Pacific. Resource
allocation within CPWP is determined by operators usually
without the assistance of personnel trained in financial
management
.
There are 3 6 pilots in each squadron trained to fly the
P-3 aircraft. Part of that training focuses on fuel
management and the factors that should be considered in
determining fuel requirements for each type of mission.
Conservation of fuel is emphasized from the beginning of
training but there are few feedback mechanisms to help a
pilot determine if his practices are the most efficient.
Fuel management models are available to help in planning
point to point missions that are not operational, i.e.,
flights similar to the profile of a commercial airline
company. These detailed models provide excellent feedback
on whether the aircraft is being flown efficiently. For
operational flights and many of the training evolutions,
there is no model to provide feedback to a pilot on
efficient use of resources. Although some fuel planning can
be achieved using the P-3 flight operations manual, the most
common methods of determining fuel requirements for various
missions are "rules of thumb." These are guidelines
generated through experience and training. They are a rough
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estimate, cushioned on the safe side of fuel requirements,
and are controlled by the pilot in command. Unlike the
airlines, there is no organizational control of the amount
of fuel loaded on an aircraft for a particular mission.
Because cost information is not available for the different
types of missions, a pilot does not have a model based on
actual flights to predict requirements or to measure
efficiency once the flight is completed. For squadrons that
record fuel efficiency on individual flights, there is a
tendency to compare those fuel usage rates to the funded
rate. This is deficient from two standpoints: (1) the
funded cost per hour includes an expenditure allowance for
ground maintenance, and (2) the cost differs for many of the
missions being flown. A monthly average of fuel usage for a
pilot may be useful when compared to an overall squadron
average, but there is too much time delay in feedback, an
important factor in management control systems.
On a day-to-day basis, the squadron's operations officer
is the manager responsible for flight hour allocations. He
may not be a pilot and may be unfamiliar with consumption
rates for the various missions. Information on fuel
consumption may come from individual flights, but most
probably comes from the squadron 10 day reports which are
object class reports. The 10 day reports include fuel usage
rates for the last 10 days, the month to date, quarter to
date, and fiscal year to date. Quite often, average cost
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for a 10 day period is considerably off from the funded
amount and the quarterly average is close to the funded. A
program costing model would enable better estimates of short
period expenditures and provide a more useful flight hour
planning tool. Frequently, there are problems at the end of
the quarter trying to gauge the expenditure of the remaining
resources because the funded average is only valid as a
predictive model for long periods of time.
In addition to flight hour planning, the operations
officer is in charge of pilot training. The availability of
program costs would provide better evaluation of pilot
performance. There are pilots who make an effort to
conserve fuel where possible and there are others who
frequently take more than required, or who do not fly the
aircraft in the most efficient manner. A program costing
model with reasonable variances provides the opportunity for
the operations officer and pilot training officer to monitor
trends in flight performance and provide feedback when
required.
In the regression analysis, the gallons of fuel used per
flight was directly related to the number of hours flown.
The same mission or program usually requires approximately
the same amount of flight time, e.g., most pilot training
flights are three to five hours, maintenance check flights
are usually less than one hour, operational flights are
eight to ten hours, mining two to three hours, etc. .
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Programs of similar lengths and flight profiles could be
combined to produce standards accurate enough to measure
efficiency and provide the realistic planning tool needed by
the operations officer. Once gallons per hour rates are
known for the individual programs, they can be categorized
and combined to produce functional management control tools.
This would be an improvement over using the funded rate as a
standard for planning, determining efficiency or measuring
flight performance.
The commanding officer of a squadron generally is not
concerned with the details of cost management. However, he
can use improved program information in determining the
optimum allocation of resources. Although squadron
effectiveness in a particular program is difficult to
measure, one attribute available to a commanding officer
under a program structure is the ability to compare the
amount of resources dedicated to particular missions with
the average of all 12 squadrons. Averaging all 12 squadrons
resource allocations eventually produces a useful model from
which stardards and variances can be determined. These
standards provide a focus for the organization and help
determine the level of resources that should be devoted to a
particular program. Optimizing readiness and training
drives the allocation of flight resources on a day-to-day
basis. However, the system does not provide any indication
of whether the readiness and training objectives were
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achieved in the most efficient manner. The program
structure created from averaging information from all
squadrons may or may not be optimal, but it does establish a
baseline for resource allocation that is applicable to the
decision-making process in all 12 squadrons.
CPWP is the highest level in the chain of command that
would benefit from increased program cost information. He
is the individual who must make the difficult decisions on
funding priorities in a constrained fiscal environment. He
provides the focus for the organization on program priori-
ties. Flight hours for CPWP decreased from over 80,000 in
FY87 to less than 70,000 for FY88. CPWP makes the decision
on how the organization will adapt to such a decrease in
flight hours. Improved program costing would help CPWP in
decision-making because it would provide specific
information on savings for a variety of alternatives.
Knowing how much of the organization's resources are devoted
to each program is critical in making economic choices.
There is a critical mass level for the core missions, a
service quantity that cannot be cut without degrading safety
and readiness objectives. This core represents the minimum
acceptable funding level. Programs that are not primary or
secondary missions are candidates for elimination, but
knowing the resultant savings is important because it
reduces the number of changes in decisions required to meet
specified budget targets. These are programs that may have
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evolved when resources were available to accommodate
additional missions. Under fiscal constraints, the focus
must be reestablished for the organization's primary
missions.
The average of all squadron program flight hour
allocations could provide a meaningful management control
tool for CPWP. He can evaluate the overall resources
squadrons are dedicating to particular programs and make
adjustments in organizational focus and priorities.
Increased accuracy in program costing breaks out programs
that were previously "invisible" in an object class flight
hour account. The amount of flight hour funds used in non-
flying evolutions such as preflight inspections, postflight
inspections, and maintenance could provide the information
needed to justify additional ground support equipment.
Maintaining a program structure enables CPWP to update
the flight hour budget formulation model—-PMR. Currently,
the model is supported by several assumptions on flight time
required in particular evolutions to achieve a desired
readiness and training level. The accumulation of actual
program information will either reenforce the assumptions
made in the model or provide the information needed to make
changes. This process helps to justify funding requirements
and identify critical mass levels required to support
readiness, training, and operational objectives.
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Resistance to implementation of increased costing of
flight hour programs may be expected. Some managers will
consider the increased costing too great an expansion in the
chart of flight hour accounts. Others may resist the change
because the mention of standards, variances, and measurement
of performance represent another variable that must be
considered in decision-making. Squadron commanders may feel
that increased information will result in too much control
from organizations outside the squadron that will restrict
their own decision-making authority. With computers
available to facilitate the collection and analysis of
flight information, there is an opportunity to improve the
allocation of resources and the management control of the
flight hour program. Computers provide opportunity for
improved accountability over the expenditure of resources.
Prior to the availability of computers this task would have
been too cumbersome.
One problem in tightening management controls on flight
hours is the difficulty in controlling the accuracy of data
collected for individual flights. Depending on the length
of the flight, discrepancies of 15 to 30 minutes flying time
become important in determining whether flight hour
resources are used efficiently. This would affect the
evaluation of pilot performance, but should not be a factor
in other aspects of a program costing structure.
102
Collection of fuel usage for each flight appears to be
needed if improved accuracy in program costing is desired.
The data collection system would need transaction codes to
enable information to be categorized for reports, decision
support, and program costing. Ideally, "...a database
should contain all data items that will be needed by any
user of the system, stored in such a way that they can be
retrieved." [Davis and Olson 1985 p. 524] Deriving program
costs will require the development of a relatively
standardized management information system for the
squadrons. Several concepts discussed in this next section
are important concerning development of computerized
management information systems.
D. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Everybody could use better information. No one is
doing as well as he could do if only he knew better.
[Anthony and Young 1984, p. 613]
The Comptroller of the United States reported to
Congress in July 1987 that,
Billions of dollars are being spent on uncoordinated
efforts to upgrade accounting and financial management
systems, but the efforts have routinely failed to meet
their objectives. [U.S. General Accounting Office, p. 1]
This statement underscores the necessity to determine
organizational needs accurately prior to committing
resources for systems design.
It is assumed here that a prolonged period of financial
stress will create a demand for more information to justify
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expenditure of resources. Determining what information to
collect is a difficult problem and one that is typical in
most organizations. "A common phenomenon in organizations
is the accumulation and storage of data that has very little
probability of being used." [Davis and Olson 1985, p. 256]
Management information researchers Feldman and March
concluded that accumulation of too much information is the
result of:
... (1) much of the information gathered by organizations
is for surveillance and not for decision-making, (2)
information is often gathered and communicated to persuade
and even to misrepresent, and (3) information use is a
symbol of commitment to rational choice. [Davis and Olson
1985, p. 256]
This last reason is considered the most significant.
Several other theories attempting to explain the tendency to
overcollect data are: (1) "...the increased confidence
decision-makers appear to obtain from added data" [Davis and
Olson 1985, p. 256], (2) "...people attach a significant
value to opportunities even though they are not used" [Davis
and Olson 1985, p. 256], and (3) "...value is not in the
actual use. . .but is a psychological value assigned by
recipients to having data available." [Davis and Olson
1985, p. 256]
Alvin Toffler, the author of Future Shock , finds
significant problems with society's emphasis on information
and asserts that, "...our natural capacity to filter and
select information is overworked; we are constantly required
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to operate in 'crisis mode,' resulting in higher stress and
its accompanying physical problems." [Davis and Olson 1985,
p. 257] The rapid change in technology and the increased
availability of computers have generated a capacity to
produce enormous amounts of information. "Managers have
traditionally responded to increased information
capabilities by requesting more and more information. . .the
real problem is overabundance of irrelevant information ."
[Davis and Olson 1985, p. 257]
There is a significant amount of information theory
research that has been applied to decision-making. Several
aspects of this body of theory are useful in the design of
management information systems. These include, "(1)
information has surprise value, (2) information reduces
uncertainty, (3) redundancy is useful for error control, and
(4) information only has value if it changes a decision."
[Davis and Olson 1985, p. 225] An important point is that
data should support decision-making or there is no need to
gather it. Information should be used for proactive
decision-making rather than for strictly reactive, defensive
purposes. In many cases,
the actual value of the additional information is
zero.... On the other hand, information systems may be
designed to accumulate data for later utilization in
decisions; the value of the information cannot be
determined at the time it is collected and stored. [Davis
and Olson 1985, p. 226]
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"A frequent mistake in information system design is to
produce volumes of data in the form of reports because they
are easy to produce." [Davis and Olson 1985, p. 226] As
revealed in this review, the determination of what
information to collect is not easy. This may be the root of
the problem of ineffective systems addressed by the
Comptroller General.
One of the most important advantages of a management
information and decision support system is the ability to
quickly see the results of "what if" or simulated scenarios.
An organization that needs the capability of simulation
computerized modeling typically has the following
characteristics: "(1) complex manipulation of data, (2)
several iterations required before an acceptable result is
achieved, and (3) frequent need for reanalysis." [Davis and
Olson 1985, p. 384] The flight hour program at CPWP meets
all the above criteria. It has a high degree of uncertainty
in the budget and the quarterly allocation process requires
continuous analysis of alternatives. An example of the
applicability of simulation would be to determine the effect
of a specified reduction in flight hours on qualification
time for pilots.
Development of computerized management information
systems is complex and frequently requires the skills of
specialists outside the organization [Davis and Olson 1985,
p. 427]. Use of specialists unfamiliar with the
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organization also creates problems e.g., communication of
requirements may become more difficult. It is important
that managers in the organization determine the requirements
of the system instead of letting a contractor impose
criteria that may not be useful. Tight control of the
development of a management information system may be an
important variable for successful implementation and
usefulness.
This review of management information system concepts
indicates factors that managers should be aware of in the
early development of a management information and decision
support system. Navy patrol squadrons presently are in the
early stages of computer use. There have been relatively
few users and the application has been primarily to meet
basic needs, such as tracking supply requests, and
maintaining crew readiness and training information.
Additionally, organizational training is needed to improve
utilization as management information system use expands in
squadrons.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter examined justification for using a program
structure in lieu of object classes as the baseline in
developing a financial information and accounting decision
support system. More accurate costing is needed to make
decisions on a program's potential savings if elimination or
reduction are anticipated. This is particularly true during
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a period of financial constraints where hard program
decisions are required and there is reduced room for error.
Recognizing the need for more accurate information on
program cost is only part of the problem. Implementation of
change is difficult because of organizational resistance to
change. This particular aspect frustrated the Comptroller
General so much that he sought legislation to enforce
improvements in financial management of the nation's
resources [U.S. General Accounting Office 1987E, p. 4].
Administrative initiatives had not achieved the desired
results. Many of the improvements made in federal
organizations have been only temporary because of frequent
changes in leadership positions and shifts in organizational
emphasis [U.S. General Accounting Office 1987E, p. 4].
The P-3 aircraft is responsible for a wide array of
programs. The data presented in this chapter shows that
there is significant enough variation in the cost of flying
that an overall average cost per hour may not be sufficient
for determining program cost and managing a complex flight
hour program. G-R-H introduces significant uncertainty into
the budgetary process for all defense programs. Knowing
program costs and available alternatives is essential when
the risk of cutbacks is high over a sustained period.
Improved program cost can be utilized to improve
performance and efficiency at every level in the chain of
command. There is an opportunity for feedback of flight
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performance and efficiency for pilots. Accuracy in costing
will improve the planning and management capabilities of
operations personnel. An average of all 12 squadrons
program allocations creates a standard by which individual
commanding officers can evaluate their squadron's resource
allocations and priorities. This particular aspect may
provide a tool for increasing the efficiency with which
readiness and training objectives are achieved. Variances
from the norm can help determine whether too many or too few
resources are dedicated to a particular mission. CPWP can
use program costing information in making decisions on
organizational priorities, in providing focus, and in
motivating squadrons to achieve specific objectives. CPWP
can also use the program information for making economic
decisions when flight hour resources are cut. Knowing the
cost of all programs, the critical mass for primary and
secondary missions, and the priority of missions within the
organization are important factors .in making budget
decisions. Knowledge of this information also helps to
improve the flight hour budget formulation model—PMP.
Collection of program information will either support
assumptions made in the model or provide the information
needed for changes.
Having computers in squadrons makes program costing a
feasible flight hour accounting alternative. Prior to
computers collecting the necessary information would have
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been cumbersome and inefficient. Implementing a management
information system in squadrons to collect the information
necessary for cost finding is difficult and time consuming.
The hardware is available in the squadrons, but there is a
gap in training and utilization of the hardware. With a
high turnover of squadron personnel, training becomes a
never-ending process and it is difficult to sustain momentum
and support for programs unless they can show direct benefit
for the squadron. The demand for information on maintenance
of the aircraft and the flight hour program is already
substantial. If it is assumed that additional information
is necessary to accurately determine program costs, this
suggests that an in-depth analysis of system design and
information for decision-making is required. Controls are
needed to discourage the tendency in organizations to
collect irrelevant information just because the data is
available. If information carried a price, demand for
irrelevant information would significantly decrease.
Costing of fuel to support programs is only part of the
"full cost" of a program. To determine the full cost of
flight hours and programs, allocations would be necessary
for depreciation expense on aircraft and buildings,
personnel training, pay, spare parts, maintenance on the
aircraft, and overhead expenses. This would distribute
object class expenditures to the end-products of the
organization—aircraft missions. This type of accounting
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system is similar to that of government and private





This thesis project attempted to show that timely
collection of cost information will be useful for military
decision-makers confronted with the Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings
(G-R-H) Budget Deficit Control Act and other potential
budget cuts. Chapters III, IV, and V reviewed concepts from
current literature on the G-R-H Act, financial stress,
management control in nonprofit organizations, program
structures for decision-making, and financial management
information systems.
After seven years of exceptional growth in the early
198 0s, the budget of the Department of Defense began to
experience the results of Congressional deficit control
measures. Uncertainty dominates the future budget
environment of most organizations in the military. If the
revised G-R-H Act is implemented according to plan, budgets
will continue to be cut and military leaders will be faced
with difficult economic choices. This thesis explains why
G-R-H controls are a threat to military budgets and how
organizations should prepare for a period of financial
constraint. The flight hour program for CPWP was used as a
model for evaluating the application of concepts researched
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in the thesis. Most of the thesis, however, is applicable
to any military organization.
This chapter highlights the critical points discussed in
the thesis, answers the questions proposed in the Chapter I
and suggests topics for further research.
B. GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS (GRH) ACT
The GRH Act is a complicated piece of budgetary
legislation. While the basic idea of GRH is understood, its
details and potential impact are a puzzle for many
government managers. Whether GRH is ever allowed to again
get to the point of sequestration will be decided by
politicians under pressure from voters. There is pressure
to spend money to keep the economy growing, pressure to not
raise taxes, increasing pressure to balance the federal
budget responsibly, and selective pressure by political
action committees seeking to influence legislation.
Although domestic spending increases are as responsible for
the nation's debt as defense, the immediate focus of
Congress seems to be to reduce defense spending below
previous rates.
Spending caps for FY88 and FY89 were established during
December 1987 in a special "Summit" meeting of the President
and Congressional leaders from both parties [U.S. Congress
1987E, Errata] . Spending limits for outlays and budget
authority were agreed on for both domestic discretionary
spending and defense spending. The outcome sent a clear
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signal of decreased funding for the nation's defense. The
Summit detailed deficit reduction measures totalling $25.6
billion for FY88 and $42 billion for FY89, which with the
spending caps, were included as part of "The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987" passed in late December 1987
[U.S. Congress 1987E, p. 2]. These measures voided the G-R-
H sequestration order of $23 billion that had taken effect
in November 1987 [Calmes 1987, p. 3117]. The sequestration
order required across-the-board cuts, but the Reconciliation
Act targeted more specific revenue increases and budget
cuts. To comply with the Summit agreement, DOD pared $13
billion in budget authority from the FYS 8 budget and reduced
the FY89 budget request by $33 billion [Towell 1988 no. 2,
p. 55]. These reductions represent the beginning of an
effort to eliminate the nation's deficit by FY93.
The Summit spending caps have increased the difficulty
of making economic choices for both domestic programs and
defense, and have caused Congressional committees to look
for opportunities to work around the limitations imposed by
the Summit. For example, definitions of "revolving fund"
accounts are being changed from discretionary to mandatory
in an effort to increase the discretionary budget authority
available [Congressional Quarterly 1988D, p. 727]
.
The G-R-H Act requires automatic sequestration if the
forecasted deficit exceeds the deficit targets by more than
$10 billion [Congressional Quarterly 1988B, p. 336].
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Sequestration involves equal percentage cuts in budget
authority for all eligible domestic and defense programs
[Congress 1987A] . DOD is required to absorb 50% of the
total spending cuts [Congress 1987A] . The decision on
sequestration is made at the end of August and becomes
effective at the beginning of the new fiscal year unless
Congress can correct the problem prior to that time
[Congressional Quarterly 1988B, p. 336] . The sequestration
decision is based on economic forecasts of the deficit
[Cranford 1988 no. 8, p. 337]. Large forecast errors are
possible with small percentage changes in the estimate of
revenues, interest rates and GNP [Cranford 1988 no. 8, p.
338] . The forecasts have averaged $42 billion below the
actual deficit for the last 10 years [Cranford 1988 no. 8,
p. 337]. Congress has indicated that it will use the
forecast of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB)
instead of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in August
1988 [Congressional Quarterly 1988D, p. 726]. It may be
speculated that this decision is because 0MB 's is more
favorable and reduces the likelihood of sequestration in an
election year. Sequestration is limited by the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1987 to a
maximum of $36 billion for FY89 [Congressional Quarterly
1988B, p. 336]. If the optimistic economic forecast of 0MB
does not meet the requirement, DOD could be in for increased
budget cuts as early as FY89.
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The primary objective of the deficit reduction measures
is to reduce outlays--the money actually spent in a fiscal
year [Congressional Quarterly 1988B, p. 336] . Appropria-
tions are in terms of budget authority, the amount of money
that can be obligated for a program [Congressional Quarterly
1988B, p. 336] . Appropriation accounts such as military pay
and operations and maintenance (O&M) are annual appropria-
tions and spend almost all of their funds in the year
appropriated,* i.e., they have a high spend-out rate [Kaufman
1986, p. 10]. Procurement and other investment accounts
have multiple-year appropriations and spend only a portion
of the program cost each year [Kaufman 1986, p. 10]. Since
the objective is to reduce outlays, the fast spend-out
accounts of O&M and personnel are more at risk for reduction
than slow spending accounts [Kaufman 1986, p. 34].
Secretary Carlucci has cut some programs in an attempt
to keep from cutting personnel and operating funds
excessively, but to save $1 in outlays requires a reduction
of three to four times that amount in budget authority for
procurement accounts [Congressional Quarterly 1987F, p.
2443; Towell 1988 no. 9, p. 522]. Although officials are
trying to avoid cuts that impact readiness, the potential
for reductions in the flight hour program is high.
Decision-makers for most programs in the military must
prepare themselves for difficult economic choices over the
next five years.
116
C. FINANCIAL STRESS AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL
The G-R-H Act requires increased budgetary austerity
through FY93 if the legislation is implemented according to
schedule. For many government organizations, this prolonged
period of constraints will create fiscal stress. Jones'
model of organizational fiscal stress presented in Chapter
IV is one means of appraisal of the phases that an
organization can expect to go through when subjected to
reduced funding [Jones 1984, p. 52].
The initial phases depicted by the model can already be
supported by actions within DOD and Congress. When deficit
control measures were first initiated in the 1985 G-R-H Act,
DOD estimates of future budgets seemed to ignore that a
crisis existed [Kaufman 1986, p. 11]. The budget
predictions showed increases that were inconsistent with
deficit control proposals. Testimony by DOD officials
before Congressional subcommittees sought support for
continued defense increases, blaming domestic spending for
the deficit problem [U.S. Congress 1987A, p. 215]. Other
committee testimony resulted in a decrease in support for
spare parts purchases, a less visible expenditure reduction
that may not have an impact for several years [U.S. Congress
1987A, p. 297]. Not until January 1988, when major program
cuts were announced, did DOD appear to acknowledge that an
austere fiscal environment was more than temporary.
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All of these actions agree with the initial phases of
recognition of financial crisis in the Jones model. One of
the major points of the model and of this thesis is that
hard choices have to be made between across-the-board cuts
and program cuts once prolonged fiscal stress takes place.
Decision-makers at all levels are likely to be confronted
with difficult budgetary choices. The easiest path is
across-the-board cuts, a choice that generally dominates the
early phases of decision-making. The model predicts, and
there is evidence to support, that an extended period of
budget austerity will require program cuts [Jones 1984, p.
54; Towell 1988 no. 9, p. 522]. This is the point where
military leaders must provide leadership to guide
organizational response. A clear set of priorities can be
established to direct the expenditure of limited financial
resources. These decisions should be based on a program
costing structure which provides the benefit of accurately
determining cost of both essential and nonessential
programs. The importance of program costing at all levels
of decision-making was discussed in detail in Chapter V.
Critical mass levels below which performance should not fall
can be determined for programs central to the primary
mission of the organization [Jones 1984, p. 56]. Programs
on the fringe of the organization's responsibilities should
be reviewed for elimination if program cuts become
necessary. The savings to be gained through elimination of
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low priority programs should be accurately computed due to
the definition of G-R-H cutback targets and the relatively
short response time available to achieve the desired
results. An alternative to cutting programs not central to
the mission of the P-3 program is to charge reguesting
activities for the cost of the flights [Byrne 1987].
Implementing this sort of option also would reguire better
cost information for programs and well-established
priorities for budget reduction.
A military organization's public status generates a set
of problems not found in a private sector company. The lack
of a profit motive, lack of competition in a free market,
and the difficulty of measuring outputs creates difficult
management problems. Performance indicators of efficiency
and effectiveness are hard to derive and evaluate. The
warning signals of problems in performance that are provided
by the ability to measure a profit are not available in most
military organizations. The rapid turnover in leadership
positions also dilutes the ability to provide a focus for a
military organization. A lack of focus creates an
opportunity for miscellaneous programs to enter the
responsibility network of the organization. Because
procurement of additional weapons platforms is so expensive,
the P-3 has been targeted freguently for increased
responsibilities. Its size and long range make it adaptable
to a number of different missions. The first problem is
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that missions are added without cost impact considerations.
Second, there does not appear to be any hard-headed review
process to eliminate programs. Extended fiscal stress
requires a review of programs, their cost, and their
priority within the organization.
D. ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION
There is general agreement in the literature on
budgeting and financial management of the need for increased
emphasis on cost containment during periods of fiscal
stress. Managers look to accounting and financial
management systems as a source of information for decision
making and control. GAO reviews of the government's
accounting and financial management information systems
indicate that proper information often is not generated by
existing systems [U.S. General Accounting Office, p. 1]
.
The GAO report noted that, "Today's financial reports
provide a flood of information. All too often, the
financial data in those reports are inconsistent,
incomplete, unreliable, and untimely." [U.S. General
Accounting Office 1985B, p. 1] The Comptroller General
acknowledged in a July 1987 report to the Senate Committee
on Government Affairs that,
. . .billions of dollars are being spent on uncoordinated
efforts to upgrade accounting and financial management
systems, but these efforts have routinely failed to meet
their objective. I am concerned about our government's
inability to effectively hold federal managers accountable
for their financial activities, generally because we lack
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essential financial data. [U.S. General Accounting Office
1987E, p. 1]
Further, the importance of having an effective financial
management information system may not be appreciated until
constrained resources require difficult economic choices.
Decisions made when resources are plentiful often do not
require effective systems because higher margins for error
were available in making decisions.
GAO reports on the redesign of financial information and
accounting systems support the concept of a budget organized
by programs instead of object classes [U.S. General
Accounting Office 1985B, p. 32]. This is one of the focal
points of this thesis and is supported by DOD as well as the
GAO. The GAO envisions a "roll-up" of planned and actual
expenditures according to transaction-coded programs [U.S.
General Accounting Office 1985B, p. 32]. The system would
start at the lowest level of management control, a program
element, and then would be summarized into larger categories
at each level in the chain of command. One of the major
problems that GAO identifies is that, "The budget is
normally prepared on a program basis while the accounting is
generally done on an organizational and object class basis."
[U.S. General Accounting Office 1985B, p. 13]
This thesis demonstrates the extent to which this is
true for the P-3 flight hour program. The primary P-3
report is the Budget OPTAR Report (BOR) , which is expressed
strictly in an object class format.
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Programs are summarized in a separate reporting system,
but there is no comparison of this data to the flight hour
budget formulation model—PMR. Such a comparison would
enable the determination of variances and would thus support
more realistic and meaningful budgeting. PMR appears
currently to be used only as a rough anchor point for flight
hour budget formulation and execution rather than a useful
financial management control instrument. The current PMR
model is reviewed approximately every four years to see if
its assumptions remain valid. The model assumes that
squadrons spend specific amounts of flight time on
individual programs to meet readiness and training
requirements. The opportunity to compare the resources that
the model assumes are devoted to training and readiness
programs with what is actually happening can be obtained
through collection and analysis of program data as
indicated. The differences between planned resource
expenditures dictated by the model and actual program
expenditures may be examined to determine if the resources
of the squadrons need to be redirected to meet the model, or
if the model needs to be changed.
The current PMR model may prove beneficial in
determining the critical mass level for programs that are
essential to readiness and training. Previous flight hour
funding levels and the readiness achieved also may help
determine the critical mass level for programs. Funding
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based on PMR uses 52 flight hours per crew per month. This
aggregate is not detailed enough to compare the planned with
the actual. The important parts of PMR are the programs
that support the aggregate. Program-based accounting would
allow the comparison of specific programs within the PMR
model, such as pilot training, tactical training, mining,
instrument training, etc., to what is actually being
performed and consumed in the squadrons. Knowledge of
resources consumption for programs, the critical mass levels
required for each program, and the current readiness status
of squadrons is a prerequisite for more accurate prediction
of the impact of flight hour cuts on squadron readiness. A
budget formulation model based on current information also
would provide more certainty in negotiation for budget
requirements. Better knowledge of program cost, critical
mass levels and priorities will enable more successful
adaptation to budgetary uncertainty over the next five
years.
The primary advantage of better cost information is that
it reduces uncertainty [Davis and Olson 1985, p. 205].
However, determination of the proper information to be
collected in a financial management information system is
one of the more difficult problems in creation of an
effective system. Management information specialists
generally agree that there is an enormous amount of
irrelevant data collected. Many organizations collect data
123
because, "...information use is a symbol of commitment to
rational choice." [Davis and Olson 1985, p. 256] Informa-
tion collected should be used in proactive decision-making
instead of providing defensive support to justify the
organization's existence or providing a symbol of commitment
to rational choices. Collecting information and not using
it for decision-making or collecting the wrong information
supports the Comptroller General's comment on the wasting of
billions of dollars on the creation of ineffective systems.
Hopwood also notes that, "The tendency for accounting over
time to emphasize the procedural and the routine, to the
detriment of the managerial and the strategic, has recently
been recognized as a problem." [Hopwood (undated), p. 184]
E. CPWP EVOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
CPWP is taking positive steps in establishing a program
structure for decision-making. The information on the hours
dedicated to programs is already being collected. However,
the accuracy of program costing could be improved by using
the cost per hour for each mission profile instead of the
annual funded cost per hour. The annual average cost is
deficient for program costing because: (1) it includes both
ground operations and flight operations, and (2) the
variation in program cost per hour could be significantly
different than the average. More accurate program costing
will help decision-makers at CPWP with choices if program
cuts become necessary. As discussed in Chapter V, if CPWP
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used program information from all 12 squadrons, it could
create a baseline from which squadron commanding officers
could evaluate their allocation of resources across mission
areas. Once a standard is established for allocation of
resources to particular programs and mission areas, the
opportunity for effective use of variance analysis becomes
available. Variance analysis would enable cost per hour
evaluation for programs and also evaluation of the
allocation of resources to a particular program.
Establishing such standards would require an extensive data
base, but also will improve the management control system.
Collection of costing information for programs will
require a standardized, transaction-coded management
information system. As indicated in this thesis, numerous
technical and organizational obstructions are present in
creating and implementing an improved control system. The
system must show benefits for the end-users and top
management should be directly involved for effective
implementation. The Comptroller General's frustration over
the lack of results from administrative actions to improve
financial management information systems resulted in the
request for legislative action [U.S. General Accounting
Office, p. 1] . The high turnover rate and lack of
continuity in government generally, and in military
leadership positions also is a detriment to implementing
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lasting financial management control changes [U.S. General
Accounting Office 1987E, p. 4].
Squadrons under the control of CPWP have the hardware
available to collect improved program cost information, but
training in the use of computers and their capabilities is
lacking. Effective implementation is possible if the
information system can be used with minimal training, if
this training need is met, and if the system includes the
ability to meet all flight hour reporting requirements.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the arguments in this thesis, the following
actions are recommended:
1. CPWP should continue with their efforts to more
accurately determine the resources being devoted to
the various missions in the VP force. The information
on hours devoted to specific programs is already
available; therefore, the relative percentage of
resources allocated to programs could be determined.
2. Using the average hours allocated to programs, a
baseline could be created to update the budget
formulation model—PMR* This information could
provide a meaningful model for commanding officers to
evaluate their allocation decisions. This also helps
CPWP in deciding whether the current distribution of
resources among programs is compatible with the
organization's priorities.
3. To provide the flexibility necessary to respond to a
volatile budgetary process, more accurate program
costing is needed. This would require the
establishment of an improved financial information
system for collecting the necessary data. This can be
achieved through management information system
contractors or if funds are not available, be
initiated in-house using higher generation software.
Students in the Naval Postgraduate School computer
science curriculum could assist in the development as
part of their thesis research.
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4. A model for determining flight efficiency should be
developed for operational flights from each of the
deployment sites. This would provide an improved
prediction system for planning individual flights,
planning resource allocations, and for measuring the
efficiency of individual flights.
5. A coding system should be developed along with the
information system to facilitate program costing and
required reporting of flight hour expenditures.
6. Once program information is available, a cost-benefit
analysis should be done to see if the purchase of
additional ground support equipment is justified.
G. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following topics appear to require further research:
1. Development of a financial information system for
implementation at the squadron level. This is a
prerequisite for improving the collection of program
costing information and is a realistic thesis project
for students in the computer science curriculum.
2. The data base of flight hours collected at CPWP should
enable the computation of hours of flight time devoted
to programs . This research would provide a standard
for resource allocation to programs in the squadron.
3. The development of fuel usage models for different
programs would provide a better planning tool for
operations personnel, would provide a better
- measurement of efficiency for pilots, and with a large
enough sample would enable the determination of
program cost with just knowing the hours flown.
4. A cost-benefit analysis of ground support equipment
versus use of the aircraft's APU may prove that the
purchase of more ground equipment is financially
sound.
5. Follow-up on G-R-H and its impact on defense is an
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